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Abstract
A number of earlier studies have examined whether extensive
labour market programmes (ALMPs) contribute to upward wage
pressure in the Swedish economy. Most studies on aggregate data
have concluded that they actually do. In this paper we look at this
issue using more recent data to check whether the extreme conditions
in the Swedish labour market in the 1990s and the concomitant high
levels of ALMP participation have brought about a change in the
previously observed patterns. We also look at the issue using three
diﬀerent estimation methods to check the robustness of the results.
Our main ﬁnding is that, according to most estimates, ALMPs do
not seem to contribute signiﬁcantly to an increased wage pressure.
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6 IFAU—ALMPs and wages1 Introduction
Sweden has a long tradition of active labour market policies (ALMPs).
The intellectual origins of modern Swedish labour market policies can
be traced back to the writings of trade union economists G¨ osta Rehn
and Rudolf Meidner in the late 1940s and early 1950s (see especially LO
(1951)). During the recent recession, the volume of labour market pro-
grammes has reached unprecedented levels, peaking at almost 5% of the
labour force in 1994.
The use of active labour market programmes rather than “passive” in-
come support to the jobless can be motivated along several diﬀerent lines
of reasoning. To the extent that active policies improve matching between
vacancies and unemployed workers, they may result in higher employ-
ment and lower unemployment; to the extent that active policies involve
skill formation among the unemployed, they may improve employment
prospects among the unemployed; to the extent that they improve the po-
sition of outsiders in the labour market, they may reduce wage pressure;
and to the extent that they stop the depreciation of human capital among
the unemployed, they may keep labour force participation up. In all these
respects successful labour market policies provide a better alternative than
income support for the unemployed workers.
These desirable eﬀects may, however, come at a cost. Programmes
in the form of subsidised employment may cause direct crowding out of
regular employment. Moreover, to the extent that programmes actually
provide a better alternative than income support for the unemployed, this
may, in itself, cause unions to push for higher wages, since the punishment
for higher wage demands becomes less severe if union members are better
oﬀ than they would have been as unemployed workers.
The net eﬀect of programmes on wage pressure will in general be am-
biguous, simply because we have programme inﬂuences working both to
lower and to raise wage pressure. In this respect, the question of the net ef-
fects on wage pressure may be said to be an empirical one. A quick glance
at previous empirical studies of the eﬀects of labour market programmes
on wages, at least at the aggregate level, indicate that the wage-raising
eﬀect seems to have dominated (see Section 2).
Although the number of studies is fairly large, there are at least three
(good) reasons to undertake yet another study.
First, most studies use data predominantly from the decades before
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 7the 1990s, when both unemployment rates and programme participation
were much lower than they have been for the last few years. To the extent
that the high rates of joblessness have changed the wage setting process in
the Swedish economy, there is some potential value added in performing
a study on data that covers as long a period as possible of this decade.
Even if the fundamental modus operandi of the labour market is stable,
it may be that the eﬀects of ALMPs vary over diﬀerent phases of the
business cycle. If that is the case, one can argue that estimated eﬀects
relying on data from previous decades may provide bad or no insights at
all relating to the eﬀects of ALMPs presently, simply because there is no
earlier counterpart to the downturn of the early 1990s.
Second, a related observation is that not only the volume, but also
the composition of ALMPs has changed in the 1990s. One potentially
important change, for example, is that relief work no longer is the major
form of subsidised employment. This may be important, because the
compensation for the participants in relief work has been higher than the
compensation in other programmes.
Third, there have been some recent developments in time-series meth-
ods, primarily related to the analysis of non-stationary time series. A
careful application of these methods may provide new insights and en-
able us to check for the robustness of the results with respect to diﬀerent
empirical modelling strategies.
Although, given suﬃcient knowledge about the true data generating
process (DGP), there generally exists an optimal way to estimate a model,
the true DGP is of course never known in practice. This normally means
that the econometrician faces a number of tradeoﬀs: some method, al-
though perhaps asymptotically the most eﬃcient one, may have bad small-
sample properties; systems modelling very rapidly consumes degrees of
freedom, thus limiting the number of variables it is possible to model;
mis-speciﬁed dynamics may interfere with inference about long-run rela-
tions of interest and so on.
To minimise the dependence on results from a single modelling attempt
(and, thus, to check the robustness of our results), we look at the data
using three diﬀerent estimation strategies: ﬁrst,w ee s t i m a t eal o n g - r u n
wage-setting relation using Johansen’s (1988) full information maximum
likelihood method, second, we estimate dynamic wage-setting equations
of the error-correction type. Finally, we estimate a long-run wage-setting
relation using canonical cointegrating regressions. This approach distin-
8 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesguishes our work from most previous studies of Swedish wage setting, that
predominantly rely on single-equation methods.
Our main result is that, unlike most previous studies, we do not ﬁnd
that extensive ALMPs seem to contribute to an increased wage pressure.
This may reﬂect that mechanisms in the Swedish labour market have
changed in the face of the recent recession or that the diﬀerent mix of
measures used during the 1990s has made a diﬀerence. Recursive estima-
tions do not, however, indicate any signs of signiﬁcant parameter instabil-
ity. To check what the diﬀerence between our results and the results in
earlier studies reﬂect, we have conducted some sensitivity analysis. Our
main conclusion from these exercises is that data revisions are the driving
force.
Another important result is that we ﬁnd a stable eﬀect of unemploy-
ment (of the expected sign) on wage pressure, although our point estim-
ates are in the lower end1 of the spectrum deﬁned by the results in earlier
studies.
2 Previous empirical studies
Beginning with the work of Calmfors and Forslund (1990) and Calmfors
and Nymoen (1990), a number of studies of Swedish aggregate wage setting
have estimated eﬀects of active labour market policies on wage setting.
The results of these studies are summarised very brieﬂy in Table 1. The
dominating impression from the table is that, if anything, the wage-raising
eﬀect of ALMPs seems to dominate, although a number of the studies have
come up with no signiﬁcant eﬀect in any direction.2
The entries in the table also points to the fact, stressed in the intro-
duction, that most studies have sample periods that end before the recent
recession. Common to all studies in Table 1, as well as a fairly large
number of other studies of Swedish wage setting, is that unemployment
invariably is found to exert a downward pressure on real wages; typical
long-run elasticities fall between −0.04 and −0.23.3
1Looking at the absolute value of the estimated eﬀect.
2There are also some studies on micro data that point to no eﬀects or wage moder-
ating eﬀects of ALMPs (Edin, Holmlund, and ¨ Ostros, 1995; Forslund, 1994). See also
Raaum and Wulfsberg (1997) for an analysis with similar results for Norway using micro
data.
3In international comparisons, the sensitivity of Swedish wage setters to variations
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 9Table 1: Eﬀects of ALMPs on wages according to studies on aggregate Swedish
data
Study Sample period Eﬀects of ALMPsa
Short run Long run
Newell & Symons (1987) 0 0
Calmfors & Forslund (1990) b 1960–86 + +
Calmfors & Nymoen (1990) c 1962–87 + +
Holmlund (1990) b 1967–88 na +
L¨ ofgren & Wikstr¨ om (1991) c 1970–87 +/0 d 0/+ d
Forslund (1992) e 1970–89 +/− d +/− d
Forslund & Risager (1994) f 1970–91 0 0
Forslund (1995) b 1962–93 0 +
Johansson, Lundborg & Zetterberg (1999) 1965–90; 1965–98 +; 0 g +; 0 g
Rødseth & Nymoen (1999) c 1966–94 0 +
a A “+” sign indicates a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, a “−” sign a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect and
a “0” no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
b Private sector
c Manufacturing sector
d Separate eﬀects of relief work and training, respectively
e 12 Unemployment insurance funds
f Separate analyses of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector
g Eﬀects found in the shorter and longer samples, respectively
Most previous studies ﬁnd that an increased tax wedge between the
product real wage rate and the consumption real wage rate4 contributes
signiﬁcantly to wage pressure, both in the short run and in the long run
(Bean, Layard, and Nickell, 1986; Calmfors and Forslund, 1990; Forslund,
1995; Forslund and Risager, 1994; Holmlund, 1989; Holmlund and Kolm,
1995). Two previous papers look at the eﬀects of income tax progressivity,
Holmlund (1990) without ﬁnding any signiﬁcant eﬀect and Holmlund and
Kolm (1995) ﬁnding that higher progressivity gives rise to signiﬁcant wage
moderation.
Finally, most of the studies employ single-equation estimation meth-
ods; some using instrumental variables techniques. The more recent stud-
ies typically estimate error-correction models.
in the unemployment rate has been high, see for example Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(1991) and the survey in Forslund (1997). The latter also contains a general survey of
studies of Swedish wage setting on aggregate data.
4This wedge reﬂects income taxes, payroll taxes and value-added taxes.
10 IFAU—ALMPs and wages3 Theoretical considerations
The fact that re-employment rates for unemployed workers tend to fall
over time, as is pointed out by for example, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman
(1991), has put focus on ALMPs as a device to counteract the marginal-
isation of long-term unemployed workers.5 Active labour market policies
could help maintain an eﬃcient pool of unemployed job searchers by in-
creasing the outsiders’ search eﬃciency when competing over jobs. This
is likely to reduce wage pressure, since the welfare of an insider is reduced
in case she becomes unemployed. In addition, however, there may be an
oﬀ-setting eﬀect which tends to increase wage pressure; see for example
Calmfors and Forslund (1990), Calmfors and Forslund (1991), Calmfors
and Nymoen (1990), Holmlund (1990), Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993) and
Calmfors and Lang (1995). The reason is that ALMPs are likely to in-
crease the welfare associated with unemployment because, for example,
current or future employment probabilities increase, or simply because
the payment in programmes may be higher than in open unemployment.
The study by Calmfors and Lang (1995) derives the two oﬀ-setting eﬀects
in one encompassing, although quite complex, model. The ﬁrst eﬀect can
be illustrated graphically in Figure 1 as a downward shift in the wage
setting schedule (WS), whereas the second eﬀect can be illustrated as an
upward shift in WS.
Active labour market policies may, however, also aﬀect the demand for
labour. For example, ALMPs may aﬀect the matching process, which in
turn alters the supply of vacancies, or equivalently, the demand for labour.
The matching process is, for example, likely to improve when the supply
of workers becomes better adapted to the demand structure6 or if the
search eﬃciency of the unemployed workers increases. Improved matching
increases the speed at which a vacancy is ﬁlled. This, in turn, increases
the proﬁtability of opening vacancies, and hence more vacancies will be
opened. One would, consequently, expect intensiﬁed job search assistance
to have an ambiguous impact on the wage setting schedule in accordance
with the earlier discussion, but have a positive impact on the demand for
5Although it is hard to distinguish negative duration dependence from selection as
the reason behind the observed lower hazards to employment for the long-term unem-
ployed.
6This aspect is closely related to the original raison d’etre for ALMPs put forward
by Rehn and Meidner in the 1950s
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 11labour (an upward shift in RES in Figure 1). If one instead considers
the impact of training programmes or relief jobs on the matching process,
one has to account for possible locking-in eﬀects on programme parti-
cipants. Although the matching process may improve post-programme
participation, evidence suggests that search eﬃciency and re-employment
probabilities are lower for programme participants during the course of
the programme than for openly unemployed; see Edin (1989), Holmlund
(1990), Edin and Holmlund (1991) and Ackum Agell (1996). Hence, the
impact on both the wage setting schedule and the labour demand schedule
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Figure 1: Employment and wage determination
ALMPs may also aﬀect labour demand by directly reducing the num-
ber of ordinary jobs oﬀered. Job creation schemes, like for example public
sector employment schemes, and targeted wage or employment subsidies
are particularly thought of as programmes that crowd out ordinary jobs.
One usually distinguishes between the dead weight loss eﬀect and the sub-
stitution eﬀect. The dead weight loss eﬀect refers to the hires from the
target group that would have taken place also in the absence of the pro-
gramme. The substitution eﬀect, on the other hand, refers to the hires
from other groups than the target group that would have taken place if the
relative price between the groups had not been altered by the programme.
These programmes are, hence, likely to shift the labour demand schedule
downwards.7 An overview of the possible inﬂuences of active labour mar-
12 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesket programmes on the employment- and wage setting schedules is given
in Calmfors (1994).
We start by deriving a representation of the demand side of the labour
market. Since we, in this paper, focus on the impact of ALMPs on wage
setting behaviour, we abstract from the possibility that programmes may
inﬂuence labour demand. Thereafter, we derive a wage setting schedule
that captures the two oﬀ-setting eﬀects of ALMPs on wage pressure that
we described earlier. In an attempt to simplify the model by Calmfors and
Lang (1995), we view ALMPs as a transition rather than as a state. The
simpliﬁcation is modelled in accordance with Richardson (1997). However,
this model, as most models used in the previous literature, captures only
some dimensions of active labour market policy. For example, to view
ALMPs as a transition rather than as a state, suits the notion of ALMPs
as job search assistance well. The previous literature that treats ALMPs as
a separate state where it is time consuming to participate in a programme,
captures dimensions of active labour market policies such as relief jobs.
Active labour market programmes as a training devise, on the other hand,
is rarely modelled rigorously in the literature.8
3.1 A Simple Model
3.1.1 Consumers and Firms
Consider a small open economy with a ﬁxed number of consumers with
identical homothetic preferences over goods.9 There are k goods that are
considered to be imperfect substitutes and are produced under monopol-
istic competition by domestic and foreign ﬁrms. The aggregate demand
function facing an arbitrary domestic ﬁrm (i) can be written as
7Direct displacement eﬀects of ALMPs in the Swedish case are discussed in Gramlich
and Ysander (1981), Forslund and Krueger (1997), Forslund (1995), Sj¨ ostrand (1997),
L¨ ofgren and Wikstr¨ om (1997) and Dahlberg and Forslund (1999).
8There are some exceptions. Larsen (1997) deals with ALMPs as an instrument
to maintain or increase the average productivity of the pool of unemployed workers.
Binder (1997) and Fukushima (1998) take ALMPs as a skill up-grading device one step
further by introducing heterogeneity in terms of skills. ALMPs provide an opportunity
for low-skill workers to upgrade their skills. Fukushima ﬁnds that in addition to the
two oﬀ-setting eﬀects traced out in the basic model, there may be a “relative labour
market tightness eﬀect” which tends to increase wage demands and unemployment,
when ALMPs are targeted towards unemployed low skilled workers.
9Homothetic preferences enables aggregation across consumers. Hence also foreign
consumers are assumed to have homothetic preferences.









),i =1 ,...,kd <k , (1)
where I is the aggregate world income, p1,...,p k a r et h eg o o d sp r i c e sa n d
Pc, the general consumer price index, is a linearly homogenous function
of all prices.10 kd, ﬁnally, is the number of domestically produced goods
(and producers).
The technology facing the ﬁrm is given by
yi = f(Ni), (2)








where Wi and pi are the ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rate and price. The propor-
tional payroll tax rate is denoted by t. Each ﬁrm chooses its price in order
to maximise real proﬁts, treating the wage as predetermined and consid-
ering itself to be too small to aﬀect the general (consumer) price level.










where ηi is the price elasticity of demand facing the ﬁrm, i.e.,
ηi =( ∂Di/∂pi)|Pc (pi/Di).
Note that ηi is a function of all goods’ prices in terms of the general
consumer price index. The price is set as a mark-up on marginal costs.
10Ignoring value-added taxes for simplicity
11We suppress physical capital to simplify the exposition. This can be justiﬁed either
if labour and capital are used in ﬁxed proportions for technological reasons, or if the
relative price of capital is ﬁxed (admittedly somewhat far-fetched). A second reason to
exclude capital from the theoretical exposition is that we believe that available measures
of physical capital and capital prices are of such a poor quality that we do not want to
use them in the empirical analysis. Thus, as the primary objective of the theoretical
exposition is to lay a foundation for the empirical analysis, we concentrate on aspects
we believe to be of importance for the empirical work.
14 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTo derive the ﬁrm-speciﬁc labour demand schedule, we use the fact that
everything produced is also sold, i.e., we combine equations (1) and (2)
with (4). This yields a relationship between Ni and Wi/Pc which is rel-
evant for the wage bargaining process. It is straightforward to show that
Ni is always decreasing in Wi/Pc if the second order condition for proﬁt
maximisation is to be fulﬁlled.
3.1.2 Wage determination
Wages are set through decentralised union–ﬁrm bargains. The bargaining
model is taken to be of the asymmetric Nash variety, where the wage
is chosen so as to split the gains from a wage agreement according to
the relative bargaining power of the two parties involved.12 The union’s
contribution to the Nash product is given by its “rent”, i.e., Ni(VNi −
VsU),w h e r eVNi is the individual welfare associated with employment
in the ﬁrm, and VsU is the individual welfare associated with entering
unemployment. The ﬁrm’s contribution to the Nash bargain is given by
its variable real proﬁt, Πi.13 The Nash product takes the following form
Ωi =[ Ni(VNi− VsU)]
λ Π1−λ
i ,i =1 ,..,kd (5)
where λ ∈ (0,1) is the bargaining power of the union relative to that of
the ﬁrm.
To derive the individual welfare diﬀerence between employment in a
particular ﬁrm and entering unemployment, VNi−VsU, we need to specify
the value functions associated with the diﬀerent labour market states. In
order to deﬁne the value functions it is, however, convenient to provide
a description of the possible labour market states and the corresponding
labour market ﬂows.
Flow Equilibrium A worker will either be employed or unemployed.
Employed workers are separated from their jobs at an exogenous rate
s, and enter the pool of short-term unemployed workers. A short-term
unemployed worker escapes unemployment at the endogenous rate α,o r
becomes long-term unemployed. The job oﬀer arrival rate facing long term
unemployed workers is lower than the arrival rate facing the short-term
12See Layard and Nickell (1990) for a more detailed presentation of the basic model.
13Thus, we assume that the value of not reaching an agreement is zero for the ﬁrm.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 15unemployed workers. A factor c ∈ (0,1) captures the diﬀerences in job
oﬀer arrival rates between the long- and short-term unemployed workers.
Figure 2 illustrates the ﬂows between the three states, i.e., employment,





Figure 2: Labour market ﬂows
Flow equilibrium requires that inﬂow equals outﬂow for each of the
three labour market states. The ﬂow equilibrium constraints for employ-
ment and long term unemployment can be written as
s(1 − Us − Ul)=αUs + cαUl (6)
cαUl =( 1 − α)Us,
which also implies a ﬂow equilibrium constraint for short-term unemploy-
ment. The labour force is for simplicity normalised to unity, which implies
that the employment and unemployment stocks are also the employment
and unemployment rates. The ﬂow equilibrium constraints in equation (6)
deﬁne the job oﬀer arrival rate α as a function of the overall unemployment
rate, U = Us + Ul,a n dc a nb ew r i t t e na s
α =
1
1 − c + cU/s(1 − U)
. (7)
16 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesThe Value Functions Deﬁne VNi, VN, VsU,a n dVlU as the expected
discounted lifetime utility for a worker being employed in a particular
ﬁrm, employed in an arbitrary ﬁrm, short-term unemployed and long-term

















[v (B)+cαVN +( 1− cα)VlU],
where r is the discount rate, v(·) the instantaneous utility of being in a par-
ticular state, Wc
i the real (after tax) consumer wage for a worker employed
in ﬁrm i, Wc the real (after tax) consumer wage for a worker employed
in an arbitrary ﬁrm, and B the real post-tax unemployment beneﬁt. The
real consumer wage for a worker employed in ﬁrm i is represented by the
expression Wc
i = Wi/Pc − T(Wi)/Pc,w h e r eT(Wi)i st a xp a y m e n t s .A n
analogous expression can be derived for a worker employed in an arbitrary
ﬁrm.
Wage Setting The nominal wage is chosen so as to maximise the
Nash product in equation (5), recognising that the ﬁrm will determine
employment, i.e., Ni = N(Wi). The union–ﬁrm bargaining unit considers
itself to be too small to aﬀect macroeconomic variables. The welfare dif-
ference associated with employment in a particular ﬁrm and entering un-
employment, VNi − VsU, can be derived from the equations in (8). The
maximisation problem yields the following wage-setting rule:
(Wc
i )
σ =( 1− σκi · RIPi)−1rVsU, (9)
where we focus on the case when the instantaneous utility function is
iso-elastic, i.e., v(x)=xσ,w h e r ex is the state dependent income, i.e.,
Wi,W ,or B. The parameter σ captures the concavity of the utility func-
tion. κi = λ(1 − ωi)/(λεNi(1 − ωi)+ωi(1 − λ)) is a broad measure of the
union market power. εNi is the labour demand elasticity and ωi is the
labour cost share, which can be rewritten in terms of the producer wage,
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 17Wi(1 + t)/Pi, and average labour productivity, Qi.14 rVsU contains only
macroeconomic variables that are considered as given to the union-ﬁrm
bargaining unit. RIPi is the coeﬃcient of residual income progression,
i.e., RIPi ≡ ∂ lnWc
i /∂ lnWi =( 1− T )/(1 − T/Wi), which deﬁnes the
degree of progressivity in the income tax system. An increase in the de-
gree of progressivity, i.e., an increase in the marginal tax rate T  relative
to the average tax rate T/Wi, is hence captured by a reduction in RIPi.
Equation (9) suggests that an increased progressivity, for a given aver-
age tax rate, reduces the wage demands. This is in line with what has
been reported in earlier studies; see for example Lockwood and Manning
(1993) and Holmlund and Kolm (1995). The reason is that an increased
progressivity reduces the gains from higher wages and induces unions and
ﬁrms to choose lower wages in favour of higher employment.
3.1.3 Equilibrium
Price Setting We can derive the equilibrium price-setting schedule











where symmetry across ﬁrms and bargaining units has been imposed,
i.e.,Ni =( 1− U)/kd, Wi = W,a n dpi = Pp,i =1 ,...,kd,w h e r ePp
is the domestic producer price index. For simplicity, all foreign ﬁrms are
assumed to set the same price, i.e., pi = PI,i = kd+1,...,k,w h e r ePI is
the common price set by all foreign ﬁrms. This leaves η in equilibrium as
a function of the price of imports relative to the price of domestic goods,
i.e., PI/Pp.
The equilibrium price-setting schedule in equation (10) gives a rela-
tionship between the hourly real producer wage W(1 + t)/Pp and the un-
employment rate U (conditional on the relative price of imports, PI/Pp,
which aﬀects the mark-up factor). The price-setting schedule (PS) reﬂects
the highest real wage producers are willing to accept at a given employ-
ment level. Hence shifts in the price-setting schedule can be referred to as
changes in the “feasible wage”. The slope of the aggregate price setting
schedule (PS)i nW(1 + t)/Pp − U space depends on whether the tech-
nology is characterised by increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to
14Qi = Yi/Ni, ωi = Wi (1 + t)/PiQi
18 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesscale. With increasing returns to scale (IRS) the price-setting schedule
has a negative slope in W(1+t)/Pp−U space, whereas the opposite holds
when there is decreasing returns to scale (DRS). See Manning (1992) for
a discussion of the case with increasing returns to scale.
Wage Setting With symmetry across wage bargaining units, i.e.,




















where ∆ = (1 + r + s)(r + αc)+(1− α)s.R e c a l lt h a tequation (7) deﬁnes
α as a function of the overall unemployment rate U. The wage-setting
schedule reﬂects wage demands at a given level of unemployment, and
shifts in the wage-setting schedule can be referred to as changes in “wage
pressure”. We can rewrite the wage-setting schedule in terms of the real
hourly producer wage by multiplying both sides in equation (11) by (1 +
t)Pc/Pp(1 − at), where at = T(W)/W. This yields the following wage-













where θ ≡ (1+t)/(1−at) is the tax wedge between the product real wage
and the consumer real wage. Pc will in general diﬀer from Pp. It is easy
to verify that Pc/Pp is monotonically increasing in the relative price of
imports, PI/Pp.
The wage-setting schedule in equation (12) gives a relationship between
the real hourly producer wage W(1 + t)/Pp and the unemployment rate
U. The relation is, however, conditioned on the relative price of imports,
the average and marginal tax rates and total real aggregate demand.
By combining the aggregate price setting schedule in equation (10)
and the aggregate wage setting schedule in equation (12), we can solve the
model for the unemployment rate (U) and the real hourly producer wage
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 19(W(1 + t)/Pp) conditional on the relative price of imports, the average
and marginal tax rates and real aggregate demand.
Comparative Statics To derive comparative statics results, we diﬀer-
entiate the PS-a n dt h eWS-schedules in equations (10) and (12) with
respect to the hourly real producer wage (W(1 + t)/Pp), the unemploy-
ment rate (U), the relative price of imports (PI/Pp), the real after-tax
unemployment beneﬁts (B), average labour productivity (Q), the degree
of income tax progressivity (RIP), the average income tax wedge (1−at),
the payroll tax wedge (1 + t) and labour market programmes. We can
conclude the following:
Price Setting
1. As previously discussed, the hourly real producer wage decreases
(increases) with a higher employment rate in case the technology is
characterised by DRS (IRS). Higher employment reduces (increases)
the marginal product when there are DRS (IRS),w h i c hr e s u l t si na
lower (higher) feasible wage. Thus the slope of the PS-schedule is
positive (negative) in W(1+t)/Pp−U space if there are DRS (IRS).
2. The hourly real producer wage is unaﬀected by changes in the payroll
tax rate (t) and average labour productivity (Q).
3. The relative price of imports will aﬀect the price-setting schedule
through the mark-up factor. However, the eﬀect can go either way.
Wage Setting
1. The hourly real producer wage falls with a higher unemployment
rate. Thus the WS-schedule is negatively sloped in W(1+t)/Pp−U
space.15 The higher the unemployment rate is, the lower will the
wage pressure exerted by the bargaining units be.
15This statement is, however, based on that the eﬀect of the real producer wage on
the labour demand elasticity is not dominating the direct eﬀect, as well as the indirect
eﬀects on the labour cost shares. Also, recall that the WS-schedule is conditioned on
the relative price of imports, the average and marginal tax rates, and the real aggregate
demand, which is the case throughout the section.
20 IFAU—ALMPs and wages2. The relative price of imports will as a direct eﬀect increase wage
pressure. There may, however, also be an indirect eﬀect working
through the labour demand elasticity. This indirect eﬀect can go
either way.
3. The hourly real producer wage increases with more generous bene-
ﬁts. Thus increases in B shift the WS-schedule upward in W(1 +
t)/Pp −U space. If we instead have an economy where after tax un-
employment beneﬁts are indexed to the average after tax wage, i.e.,
B = ρW(1 − at)/Pc, also increases in ρ increase the wage pressure.
4. An increase in average labour productivity will increase wage pres-
sure. An increased productivity reduces the labour cost share, which
in turn increases wage pressure. If the technology is iso-elastic, how-
ever, the average productivity will have no impact on wage pressure.
5. Increased tax progressivity, i.e., reductions in RIP, reduces the wage
pressure. Thus, there is a downwards shift in the WS schedule
in W(1 + t)/Pp − U space. Recall that this was also the case in
partial equilibrium.
6. An increased average income tax rate will increase the real hourly
producer wage. In fact, the hourly real producer wage will increase
with a lower income tax wedge until the hourly consumer wage ex-
pressed in producer prices, i.e., W(1 − at)/Pp, is unaﬀected. Thus,
the WS-schedule shifts upwards in W(1+t)/Pp−U space. However,
if we have an economy where unemployment beneﬁts are indexed to
the after tax consumer wage, i.e., B = ρW(1 − at)/Pc, the average
income tax rate will have no inﬂuence on wage pressure.
7. An increase in the payroll tax rate will increase the real hourly pro-
ducer wage. In fact, the hourly real producer wage increases with a
higher payroll tax wedge until the hourly consumer wage expressed
in producer prices, i.e., W(1 − at)/Pp, is unaﬀected. Thus the WS-
schedule shifts upward in W(1 + t)/Pp − U space. However, if we
have an economy where the unemployment beneﬁts are indexed to
the after tax consumer wage, i.e., B = ρW(1 − at)/Pc, the payroll
tax rate will have no inﬂuence on wage pressure.
8. From 6 and 7 we can conclude that the income tax wedge and the
payroll tax wedge can be expressed as a common wedge, i.e., θ =
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 21(1 + t)/(1 − at), as is also clear from equation (12). Increases in θ
will aﬀect the hourly real producer wage proportionally in the case
of ﬁxed real unemployment beneﬁts (B). With a ﬁxed replacement
ratio, however, the tax wedge has no impact on wage pressure.
9. ALMPs will have an ambiguous impact on wage pressure, which will
be discussed more thoroughly below.
We will proceed by characterising the impact of programmes on wage
pressure. The properties of the price-setting schedule will, however, ob-
viously be crucial when determining the impact of ALMPs on real wages
and unemployment in equilibrium.
3.1.4 Active Labour Market Policy
We will simply assume that changes in the parameter c reﬂect changes in
ALMPs directed towards the long term unemployed workers. An increase
in c captures an increase in the relative search eﬃciency of the long-term
unemployed workers, which seems to be a particularly relevant way to
model, for example, targeted job search assistance.16
Let equations (7) and (12) deﬁne the unemployment rate, U,a sa
function of the product real wage, W(1 + t)/Pp, conditional on the rel-
ative price of imports, average and marginal tax rates and real aggregate
demand. Note that changes in c will have a direct eﬀect, as well as an in-
direct eﬀect working through α, on the wage setting schedule. Shifts in the
wage setting schedule can be traced out by diﬀerentiating equation (12)
with respect to c and U, while taking into account that α depends on c and
U through equation (7), holding the product real wage ﬁxed. Rearranging












   















16The model used by Calmfors and Lang (1995) allows targeting of policy towards
new entrants, but not towards the truly long term unemployed, who are modelled as
out of the labour force in their model.





2 < 0. (15)
From expressions (13), (14) and (15) it is clear that there are two con-
ﬂicting eﬀects on the wage setting schedule following a higher c.T h e
ﬁrst term in the square brackets of equation (13) tends to increase the
wage pressure. Higher wage demands follows because a higher c increases
the welfare associated with long term unemployment. The second term
captures the impact of c channelled through α.A h i g h e r c implies that
the long-term unemployed compete more eﬃciently with the short-term
unemployed for the available jobs. This reduces the value of short-term
unemployment; lower wage demands follow as a consequence.17
One can, however, note that the size of the discount rate is crucial in
determining which of the two eﬀects that will dominate in this simpliﬁed
framework. When the future is discounted, i.e., r>0, the impact on
welfare associated with short-term unemployment will dominate over the
impact on welfare associated with long term unemployment. Thus, wage
demands will be reduced due to the higher competition over jobs facing
an employed worker in case of unemployment. In this model, ALMPs
that increase the search eﬃciency of all unemployed workers, will have no
inﬂuence on wage pressure and unemployment.
4 Empirical modelling strategies
The main focus in this paper is on wage setting. Thus, our primary interest
lies in ﬁnding a structural relationship between the factors inﬂuencing the
behaviour of wage setting agents and the outcome, in our case a bargaining
outcome, in terms of a desired real wage rate. The issue is how to model
such a structural equation. This issue, in turn, involves a lot of decisions.
Below, we will outline a number of such issues and motivate the decisions
we have made.
4.1 Static versus dynamic modelling
The theoretical framework outlined above is static, in the sense that we
focus on the steady state equilibrium of the model. Hence, our theor-
17Note that a c<1 is not necessary to generate the two oﬀ-setting eﬀects.
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number of good reasons to believe that what we observe in our data may
involve a mix of equilibria and adjustments to such equilibria.18 Lacking
explicit predictions about the dynamic paths of variables, we mainly use
our theoretical model to suggest (testable) restrictions deﬁning equilibria,
whereas we let the dynamics be suggested by the data.
An alternative would be to impose rather than to test the equilibrium
model, and use some estimator that is consistent in the presence of non-
Gaussian error terms. A drawback with this approach in our case is that
preliminary tests indicate that most of the variables of interest may be non-
stationary. Valid inference requires stationarity, which in our case would
imply estimating on diﬀerenced data. This, in turn, destroys valuable
long-run information in the data.
A second alternative would, of course, be to derive dynamics from
theory. We are, however, inclined to believe that whereas good theory may
be informative about long-run equilibrium relationships among variables,
this is not so to the same extent when it comes to dynamics.
Our modelling strategy is, therefore, to extract long-run equilibrium
information from the data by looking for theory-consistent cointegrating
vectors, and in addition to extract short-run information on dynamic ad-
justments by estimating error-correction models.
4.2 Systems versus single-equations methods
The ﬁrst generation of studies employing error-correction techniques re-
lied on single-equation methods. Recently, systems methods have become
increasingly popular, in part because of advances in econometric theory19,
in part because systems methods have become available in standard time-
series econometrics packages.20 Both approaches have their pros and cons.
The main drawback of systems modelling is that the short samples
available in most applications (including ours) put a severe constraint on
the number of variables that can be modelled. We could without problems,
using our theoretical framework and previous empirical studies of wage
18Such reasons include costs of adjustment and time aggregation, which we have not
modelled explicitly.
19Some useful references are Johansen (1988), Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and
Hendry (1993), Hendry (1995) and Johansen (1995).
20Such as EViews, PcFiml, Rats and TSP.
24 IFAU—ALMPs and wagessetting, motivate the inclusion of more than 10 variables in the analysis.
Given 38 annual observations, such an analysis is simply not feasible.
Thus, only a subset of the ap r i o r yinteresting variables can be modelled
consistently as a system. We describe below how we chose our subset.
The systems approach, however, also has important advantages.
First, it provides a consistent framework for ﬁndingthe number of long-
run relations (cointegrating vectors) among a set of variables. Moreover,
since the cointegrating vectors are not uniquely determined by data alone,
the analyst is forced to make explicit assumptions to identify them. These
assumptions imply restrictions, which are testable.
Second, a major problem with the single-equations approach is that
one has to rely on assumptions about exogeneity that are either not tested
(in the case of OLS estimation) or hard to test (instrumental variables,
IV, estimation).21 In the framework of a system, on the other hand,
exogeneity tests are an integral part of the estimation procedure. Actually,
one possible outcome of the systems approach is that it may be shown that
OLS can be applied to the equation of interest without loss of information.
The results of the systems modelling, employing Johansen’s (1988) FIML
methods are presented in Section 6.1.
Because of the constraints with respect to the number of variables
that can be included in the systems modelling, we also estimate (by IV
methods) single-equation error-correction models of wage setting. In ad-
dition to permitting a larger number of potentially important variables,
this approach also allows us to estimate the model recursively. This, in
turn, provides important information on parameter (in)stability. This
sheds light on the questions raised in the introduction relating to possible
changes in i.a. the sensitivity of wage setters to labour market condi-
tions such as unemployment and ALMPs. The estimated error-correction
models are presented in Section 7.3.
Both systems methods and single-equation error-correction models rely
on correctly speciﬁed dynamics for reliable inference about long-run rela-
tionships.22 Park (1992) suggests a way to estimate cointegrating relation-
21Exogeneity can mean a lot of things. Here it, somewhat loosely, refers to the
following situation: In the model yt = a0 + a1xt + εt, xt is said to be weakly exogenous
with respect to the parameter a1 if correct inference about it can be drawn without
modelling xt.
22Given correctly speciﬁed dynamics, the methods also, obviously, provide informa-
tion on the dynamics of the wage-setting process.
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methods to transform the data in a way that allows valid inference based
on OLS regressions on the transformed data. The method and the results
derived by it are presented in Section 7.4.
5 The data
Our data set consists of annual data over the period 1960–1997. We use
annual data partly to cover as long a time span as possible in order to be
able to analyse long-run properties of the variables, partly because there
is no variation during a year in some of our variables (for example the
income tax rates) and partly to avoid the measurement errors present in
higher-frequency series. In this section, we provide data deﬁnitions and
sources and some descriptive statistics related to the properties of the
series used in the empirical study.23
5.1 Wages
The nominal hourly wage measure used pertains to the business sector and
is generated as the ratio between the total wage sum (including employers’
contributions to social security, henceforth called payroll taxes) and the
total number of hours worked by employees in the business sector. To get
the product real wage, the wage series is deﬂated by a measure of producer
prices. The price series used is the implicit deﬂator for value added in the
business sector at producer prices. The log of the product real wage is
denoted by w − pp. Finally, to get the measure of labour’s share of value
added, which is what we end up using in most of the empirical work,
we divide the product real wage rate by average labour productivity.24
The latter variable is derived by dividing real value added in the business
sector by the total number of hours worked (including the hours worked
by employers and self-employed). The data are taken from the National
Accounts Statistics.25 The use of the National Accounts Statistics is dic-
23A more thorough data description is given in Appendix A.
24We use this variable instead of the product real wage for two reasons. First, we have
an urgent need to keep the number of variables down because of our wish to estimate
a system. Second, several empirical studies of Swedish wage setting have tested the
implied restriction on the eﬀect of productivity on wages without rejecting it (see for
example Forslund (1995); Rødseth and Nymoen (1999)).
26 IFAU—ALMPs and wagestated by our wish to cover the whole business sector, for which no direct
measure of the hourly wage rate is available for our period.
The (natural) logarithm of labour’s share of value added, (w −q),26 is
plotted in Figure 3. The series is upward trended from the early 1960s to
the early 1980s. Following the two devaluations in 1981 and 1982 as well
as in the aftermath of the depreciation of the Krona in the early 1990s,
the share falls very rapidly. Unit-root tests reported in Table 2 suggest
that the labour share of value added may be an I(1) variable.27









Figure 3: Log labour’s share of value added 1960–97
25Numbers from reports N 1975:98, N1981:2, N 10 1985 and N 10 1997 from Statistics
Sweden have been chained. This procedure has been followed for all series based on the
National Accounts. All data for 1997 are taken from preliminary ﬁgures published by
the National Institute for Economic Research (Analysunderlag v˚ aren 1998).
26We use lower-case letters to denote logarithms of the corresponding variables.
27We are well aware that single-equation unit-root tests can at best be indicative, and
we do not suggest that certain variables “are”, for example, ﬁrst-order integrated.








Log labour share of value added 1 yes -2.443 -3.547
Log labour share of value added 1 no -2.224 -2.953
Change in log labour share of value added 0 yes -4.410** -3.551
Change in log labour share of value added 0 no -4.369** -2.953
Log unemployment rate 1 yes -3.018 -3.547
Log unemployment rate 1 no -1.489-2.9 53
Change in log unemployment rate 1 yes -4.479** -3.551
Change in log unemployment rate 1 no -4.453** -2.953
Log accommodation rate 0 yes -1.999 -3.547
Log accommodation rate 0 no -2.333 -2.953
Change in log accommodation rate 3 yes -4.365** -3.551
Change in log accommodation rate 0 no -6.141** -2.953
Log tax wedge 0 yes -1.442 -3.547
Log tax wedge 0 no -2.460 -2.953
Change in log tax wedge 0 yes -5.286** -3.551
Change in log tax wedge 0 no -4.722** -2.593
Log relative import price 0 yes -1.600 -3.528
Log relative import price 0 no -1.484 -2.938
Change in log relative import price 0 yes -5.276** -3.531
Change in log relative import price 0 no -5.351** -2.94
Log replacement rate 5 yes -0.498 -3.556
Log replacement rate 5 no -1.828 -2.956
Change in log replacement rate 2 yes -6.630** -3.551
Change in log replacement rate 2 no -6.287** -2.953
Log residual income progressivity 5 yes -2.551 -3.547
Log residual income progressivity 5 no -1.616 -2.953
Change in log residual income progressivity 2 yes -7.901** -3.551
Change in log residual income progressivity 2 no -7.917** -2.953
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The number of unemployed persons is the standard measure given by the
Labour Force Surveys (LFS) performed by Statistics Sweden.28 This num-
ber of persons is turned into an unemployment rate by relating it to the
labour force. The measure of the labour force is not the one supplied by the
LFS. Instead, the labour force is derived as the sum of employment accord-
ing to the National Accounts Statistics, unemployment according to the
LFS and participation in active labour market policy measures (ALMPs)
according to statistics from the National Labour Market Board.29 This
“non-standard” deﬁnition of the labour force is used ﬁrst because the LFS
measure is not available prior to 1963 and second because it seems natural
to include programme participants in the measure of the labour force, as
active job search and joblessness are necessary conditions for programme
eligibility.
The log of the unemployment rate, u, is graphed in Figure 430. The
variation in the unemployment rate is completely dominated by the dra-
matic rise in the early 1990s. Prior to this the series exhibits a clear cyclical
pattern with every peak slightly higher than its predecessor. Looking at
Table 2, we see that unit roots cannot be rejected, even allowing for a de-
terministic trend, whereas they are rejected for the series in ﬁrst-diﬀerence
form. This would indicate that the (logged) unemployment rate behaves
like an I(1) series in our sample period. It is, however, important to re-
member that the failure to reject the null of non-stationarity does not
entail accepting a unit root; it may, for example, reﬂect other forms of
non-modelled non-stationarity such as regime shifts.
5.3 Labour market programmes
The programmes include the major ones administered by the National
Labour Market Board. Until 1984 these are labour market training and
28Due to changes in both deﬁnitions and methods of measurement, there are breaks
in the LFS unemployment series. The present series is chained by multiplying the old
series by the ratio between it and the new one at common observations.
29Only those programme participants who are not included among the employed are,
of course, added.
30We use the logarithmic transformation both because this potentially makes the
normal distribution a better approximation and, more fundamentally, because the log
form is consistent with a hypothesis about the marginal eﬀect on wages from a rise in
unemployment from 1% to 2% being larger than a rise from 9% to 10%.









Figure 4: Log unemployment 1960–97
relief work. In 1984 youth programmes and recruitment subsidies are ad-
ded. During the 1990s a vast number of new programmes were introduced.
Of these, we have included training replacement schemes, workplace intro-
duction (API) and work experience schemes (ALU). T h es o u r c eo fa l ld a t a
on ALMPs is the National Labour Market Board. The variable used to
represent ALMPs is the accommodation ratio, which relates the number
of programme participants to the sum of open unemployment and ALMP
participation. The log of the accommodation rate, γ, is displayed in Fig-
ure 5. The series shows a steep upward trend until the late 1970s, then
varies cyclically over the 1980s and falls sharply from the late 1980s, des-
pite the fact that the number of participants reached an all times high
during this period. Unit root tests reported in Table 2 fail to reject a unit
root in the (logged) levels, whereas unit roots are forcefully rejected in the
logarithmic diﬀerence series, leading us to treat the variable as potentially
I(1).








Figure 5: Log accommodation ratio 1960–1997
5.4 Taxes
The taxes in our data set are income taxes, payroll taxes and indirect
taxes, i.e., the tax components of the tax-price wedge between product
and consumption real wages. There are many possible ways to compute
taxes, so we go into some detail in Appendix At od e s c r i b eh o wo u r sh a v e
been derived. The income tax rate is computed for the tax brackets cor-
responding to the average annual labour income in the business sector
according to the National Accounts Statistics to achieve consistency with
the wage measures used. The payroll tax factor31 is computed as the
ratio between the total wage bill in the business sector according to the
National Accounts Statistics, including and excluding employers’ contri-
butions. Finally, the indirect tax factor32 is computed as the ratio between
value added in the business sector at market prices and at producer prices
according to the National Accounts Statistics.
The log of the tax wedge, deﬁned as θ ≡ log(1 + t)+l o g( 1+VA T) −
31This factor equals 1 + t.
32The indirect tax factor equals 1 + VA T.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 31log(1−at), where t is the payroll tax rate, VA T the indirect tax rate and
at the average income tax rate, is plotted in Figure 6. The wedge increases
almost monotonically until the tax reform of the early 1990s, when it falls
considerably and then stays fairly constant. Unit root tests in Table 2
(with and without trend included) do not reject the null of a unit root
in levels, whereas the ﬁrst diﬀerence seems to be stationary. Also in this
case, thus, the series will be treated as potentially I(1).






Figure 6: The log of the tax wedge 1960–97
We have also computed a point estimate of marginal income tax rates
pertaining to the tax bracket at which the average tax rate is computed.
This marginal tax rate is used to derive our measure of progressivity in the
income tax system, the coeﬃcient of residual income progressivity, RIP.
The logged series is plotted in Figure 7. Progressivity remained fairly
unchanged from the beginning of our sample period until the early 1970s,
when it increased rapidly for a number of years. This increase was halted
in 1978, when a steady decrease in progressivity culminated in the 1991
tax reform, when most progressivity was removed. Since then, little has
happened. The series is serially correlated, but almost all serial correlation
is removed by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing. The ADF tests in Table 2d on o tr e j e c ta
unit root in the series.






Figure 7: Log residual income progressivity 1960–1997
5.5 The relative price of imports
In addition to taxes, the wedge between the product real wage and the
consumption real wage reﬂects the relative price of imports. We measure
this variable by the implicit deﬂator of imports relative to the implicit
deﬂator of value added at producer prices according to the National Ac-
counts Statistics.
The (log) relative price of imports, pI − pp, plotted in Figure 8, ﬁrst
falls until 1972. The ﬁrst oil price shock pushes the relative price steeply
upwards, and subsequently, the devaluations of the late 1970s and early
1980s coincide with a continuous rise. This is reversed after the devalu-
ation in 1982, after which domestic prises rise faster than import prices
for 10 years. Finally, the depreciation of the Krona in 1990s accompanies
a reversal of this trend. The unit root tests in Table 2, which reject for
the diﬀerenced series but not for the series in logs, suggest that it may be
appropriate to treat the relative price of imports as ﬁrst-order integrated.
5.6 The replacement rate in the unemployment insurance
system
The ﬁnal variable modelled in our system is the replacement rate in the
unemployment insurance system. We measure it by the maximum daily











Figure 8: Log relative price of imports
before-tax compensation, converted into an annual compensation, in re-
lation to the average annual before-tax labour income in the business
sector33. Without going into too much details (which are given in Ap-
pendix A ) ,w ej u s tw a n tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h i si m p l i c i t l ya s s u m e st h a t
the representative union member is entitled to the maximum level of com-
pensation, which according to rough calculations seems reasonable.
The log of the replacement rate, ρ, is reproduced in Figure 9.T h e
replacement rate, according to our measure, shows a trend wise increase
until the early 1990s, after which point it decreases rather rapidly. It can
also be noted that the variations around the trend are quite large. Once
more, unit root tests reported in Table 2 indicate that the series may be
I(1).
6 Systems modelling
Our general approach to the empirical modelling is to start out from an
unrestricted vector-autoregressive (VA R ) representation of the variables
we study. Two critical choices have to be made. First, which variables
should be included, and second, which lag length should be chosen.34 In
33As computed from the National Accounts Statistics.







Figure 9: Log replacement rate in the unemployment insurance system
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 35the ﬁrst of these respects, we have mainly been guided by our theoretical
framework, but also, to some extent, by previous empirical studies of
Swedish aggregate wage setting. The determination of the lag length is
discussed below.
The model presented in Section 3.1 gave rise to two equilibrium rela-
tionships between the real wage rate and unemployment: the wage-setting
(WS) schedule and the price-setting (PS) schedule.
The discussion of the properties of the price-setting schedule in Sec-
tion 3.1.3 suggested that price setters potentially would respond to the
unemployment rate and the relative price of imports, but that the signs
of the responses would be indeterminate:




(pI − pp)), (16)
where lower-case letters denote (natural) logarithms of the corresponding
upper-case letters and the question marks denote the uncertainty of the
sign of the eﬀect. One further result from the theoretical analysis was
that the price-setting schedule is unaﬀected by changes in average labour
productivity and the tax wedge between product and consumption real
wages. Also notice that equation (16), as long as the eﬀect of the relative
import price is non-zero, can be renormalised as
pI − pp = F(u,w − pp) (17)
The corresponding results for the wage-setting schedule are summar-
ised in the following equation:















Notice that this formulation means that, when we look at the eﬀects of
increased ALMP participation, we condition on the open unemployment
rate, thus implicitly assuming that increased ALMP participation means
either decreased employment or a smaller number of persons outside the
labour force. This is in some contrast to a number of previous studies,
34There could, in principle, also be a third choice, if one is willing to assume weak
exogeneity of some variables already at the outset. Then one would have to decide which
variables could be treated as weakly exogenous (non-modelled) in the system. We did
some experimentation along these lines, but almost always ended up with systems with
badly behaved residuals.
36 IFAU—ALMPs and wageswhere instead “total” unemployment (the sum of openly unemployed and
programme participants) has been held constant. In those studies, the im-
plicit assumption is that increased programme participation exactly cor-
responds to a decrease in open unemployment. It is not ap r i o r yclear
which of these formulations is the more “reasonable” one.
Counting the variables appearing in these two equations, we arrive at
8 variables to model in a system. This calls for some restrictions prior
to further modelling, especially as we want to include a time trend in the
system to allow for deterministic trends in the data.
The system, o f t e nc a l l e dt h eunrestricted reduced form (URF),i st h e
starting point of the empirical analysis. It can be written (assuming two
lags, which is what we started out from)
yt = π1yt−1 + π2yt−2 + vt, vt  INn[0,Ω], (19)
where yt is an (n × 1) vector of observations at time t =1 ...T of the
endogenous variables. This system basically serves as a baseline model
against which to test restrictions. For such testing to be valid, it is essential
that the residuals are well behaved. The strategy then is to include the
number of lags necessary to produce such residuals. Given our sample,
where we have T =3 8 , it is fairly obvious that we have to restrict the
number of variables entering y severely in order to have enough degrees
of freedom for testing for the properties of the residuals. The restriction
we choose to impose is to model the labour share of value added (w−q)35
instead of the product real wage rate, thus imposing a coeﬃcient of unity
on productivity in both the price-setting schedule and the wage-setting
schedule. This is primarily motivated by appealing to earlier studies of
wage setting and to the “stylised fact” that the labour share seems to be
independent of productivity in the long run.36 To perform the necessary
diagnostic tests, we must reduce the system. At this stage we let the
data tell us which further variable to take out of the system, simply by
demanding a system with well-behaved residuals.37 B yt h i sr o u t ew ee n d
up in a system consisting of (w − q),u,γ,(pI − pp),θ,ρand a time trend.
35We denote the labour share by w − q rather than by w − pp − q.
36This is, e.g., discussed in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991).
37The maximum number of variables followed because we decided, ap r i o r i ,t oe s t i m -
ate a baseline system with two lags. All estimations have been performed in PcFiml
9.2, see Doornik and Hendry (1997).
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 37This system with two lags marginally passes the diagnostic tests (there
is almost signiﬁcant autocorrelation and non-normal errors). We then pro-
ceed to test for the signiﬁcance of the second lag, and the restriction π2 =0
is just about accepted by the data. There is no signiﬁcant autocorrelation
in the restricted system38, but the residuals are signiﬁcantly non-normal.
However, we decide to take this as our baseline system (including the
trend, which, according to the tests, is highly signiﬁcant).
In the single-equation unit root tests reported, we found indications
that all six variables behave like they are ﬁrst-order integrated (I(1)).
Thus, the next step is to apply the Johansen procedure to test for the
number of cointegrating vectors. We begin by rewriting equation (19) as
(imposing π2 =0 )
∆yt = P0yt−1 + vt, (20)
where P0 = π1 − In is a matrix containing long-run relations between
the variables.39 Write P0 = αβ . If the rank, p, of this matrix is n,
then yt is stationary; if p =0 , then ∆yt is stationary, all elements of yt
are non-stationary and there exists no stationary linear combination of
them. If 0 <p<n ,there are p stationary linearly independent linear
combinations of yt, and both α(n×p) and β 
(p×n) have rank p. Thus, the
problem of ﬁnding the number of cointegrating vectors consists of ﬁnding
the rank of P0.
It is fairly obvious that the wage-setting schedule is not identiﬁed
without further parameter restrictions.40 It may still, however, be the
case that the model is identiﬁed in an empirical sense: the data may ac-
cept further restrictions on parameters that actually identiﬁes the model.
What we would need is something that shifts the price-setting schedule
without aﬀecting the wage-setting schedule. We report the results of our
eﬀorts in that direction in Section 6.1 below.
38P-values for autocorrelations of order 1, 1-2 and 1-3 are .17, .69 and .24, respectively.
We would like to point out that this has been achieved without any use of dummies to
“clean” the residuals.
39To see this, deﬁne the “long run” as a situation in which ∆
yt = vt =0 . Then
clearly P0y = 0 deﬁnes a long-run relation between the variables, where the coeﬃcients
are given by P0.
40This is almost generically true of aggregate wage-setting schedules in bargaining
models, see Bean (1994) and Manning (1993).
38 IFAU—ALMPs and wages6.1 Empirical results
The Johansen procedure indicates that there may be 2 or 3 cointegrating
vectors, i.e. rank(P0) is 2 or 3, see Table 3. Although most tests indicate
that the number is 2, and although our theoretical discussion identiﬁed
2 potential cointegrating relations, we choose 3 cointegrating vectors as
our baseline case. The main reason is that we do not get any reasonable
results by pursuing the analysis under the assumption of 2 cointegrating
vectors, see Section 6.1.5 below.
As we hinted at above, even though the number of cointegrating vectors
is unique, the vectors themselves are not without further restrictions. To
see this, note that αβ  = αγ−1γβ  = α∗β∗ 
for any non-singular (p × p)
matrix γ.
Table 3: Johansen tests for the number of cointegrating vectors
H0 : rank = p −T log(1 − µ) T − nm 95% −T/
 
T log(·) T − nm 95%
p = 0 66.19** 55.16** 44.0 181.4** 151.1** 114.9
p ≤ 1 46.29** 38.57* 37.5 115.2** 95.97** 87.3
p ≤ 2 29.41 24.51 31.5 68.87* 57.39 63.0
p ≤ 3 22.38 18.65 25.5 39.47 32.89 42.4
p ≤ 4 13.13 10.94 19.0 17.09 14.24 25.3
p ≤ 5 3.956 3.296 12.3 3.956 3.296 12.3
Our preferred model assumes that we have 3 cointegrating vectors. In
this case, the dimension of α is (6 × 3) and that of β
 
is (3 × 6). Hence,
the system may be written41
41Leaving the trend out.
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The elements of the β matrix are elements of the cointegrating vec-
tors, and the elements of the α matrix can be interpreted as the speed of
adjustment for a variable to deviations from equilibrium (one of the coin-
tegrating combinations).42 If a row in α has only zeros, the implication
is that the corresponding element of ∆y is unaﬀected by any disequilibria
(or anything that happens to the variables in the system). Then there is
no loss of information from not modelling that variable, and it is weakly
exogenous to the system.43 This, of course, implies that it is legitimate
to condition on that variable in the estimations. A variable may also be
weakly exogenous with respect to one or two of the cointegrating relation-
ships, i.e., if the corresponding αij equals zero.
Imposing three cointegrating vectors, we estimated the following sys-
tem (dropping the error terms)44:
42To see this, notice that the product of the
￿
  matrix and the y vector is a (3 × 1)
vector, the elements of which are three linear combinations of the elements of y.E a c h
row of
￿ translates these into a ∆yi.
43It is important to remember that weak exogeneity is deﬁned relative to the system
at hand.
44The normalisation of the cointegrating vectors is arbitrary.
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The three unrestricted cointegrating combinations are plotted in Fig-
ure 10. The plot does not reveal too many signs of non-stationarity, al-
though there are some small tendencies of a trend in the third one.















Figure 10: Unrestricted cointegrating combinations
Imposing identifying restrictions on the β vectors to ﬁnd empirical
counterparts to the price- and wage-setting schedules (17) and (18) and
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 41testing for weak exogeneity by imposing zero-restrictions on α-parameters,
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The p-value for the test of these restrictions is 0.35 (χ2(15) = 16.48), so
the data accept the restrictions without too much protests. The restricted
cointegrating combinations are plotted in Figure 11. Also in this case, the
vectors do not seem strikingly non-stationary.
















Figure 11: Restricted cointegrating combinations
42 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesWe will return to an analysis of the properties of the residuals, but
ﬁrst we discuss the issue of identiﬁcation and the substantive results of
the analysis.
6.1.1 Identiﬁcation
There is no doubt that the system is identiﬁed in a formal sense. The crit-
ical identifying restriction is that the time trend is present in the price-
setting equation, but not in the wage-setting equation. What (if any)
would the economic intuition be? Looking at the theoretical analysis, we
can give a description of the condition in economic terms: what we need
is something that shifts the price elasticity of demand in the product mar-
ket over time without aﬀecting the wage elasticity of labour demand. As
the price elasticity of demand in the product market (η)i so n eo ft h e
components of the wage elasticity of labour demand (εN), we thus need
some trend change compensating for this trend in the product market.45
It turns out that what we need is a trend wise lower elasticity of substi-
tution between labour and other inputs to exactly compensate the trend
wise higher price elasticity of product demand. This condition deﬁnitely
would be fulﬁlled only by sheer coincidence.46 However, a rising elasticity
of product demand would be consistent with a notion of tougher compet-
ition in the world markets, and a falling elasticity of substitution would
be consistent with more specialisation and an accompanying lower sub-
stitutability among inputs. We leave it to the reader to determine how
plausible this identifying restriction is.
6.1.2 The long-run equations
We begin by looking at the long-run relations produced by the cointegra-
tion analysis. The ﬁrst equation is normalised so as to be interpretable as
45The wage elasticity of demand can be decomposed into a substitution eﬀect and an





where σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, νN the labour share
of costs and mu the ratio between price and cost (the mark-up). The argument in the
text follows if the price elasticity of the mark-up factor and the labour share of costs
do not change “too much”.
46At least the authors have had a hard time coming up with a mechanism with this
eﬀect.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 43a wage equation. If we write it out explicitly, it becomes
w − q = −0.026u +0 .067γ +0 .316ρ. (24)
Thus, in the long run there is a negative relationship between labour’s
share of value added and the unemployment rate, a positive relationship
between the share and the accommodation ratio and a positive relation
between the share and the replacement rate in the unemployment insur-
ance system. The point estimate of the long-run eﬀect of unemployment
on wage setting is rather low compared to most previous estimates (see
Section 2), which might indicate that the prolonged period of high un-
employment rates in the 1990s has aﬀected wage setting institutions ad-
versely. The estimated positive eﬀect of ALMPs is, on the other hand,
rather similar to what has been found in earlier studies. The implica-
tion is that the wage-push mechanism identiﬁed in Section 3.1.4 seems
to dominate the “job-competition” eﬀect.47 Eﬀects of the unemployment
insurance system have been notoriously diﬃcult to detect in studies using
aggregate data. Here we ﬁnd a rather strong positive relationship between
wages and the replacement rate. Finally, it is worth noting that one eﬀect
is ‘conspicuous by its absence’: we test and do not reject the restriction
of no long-run wage eﬀects48 of the wedge between the product real wage
and the consumption real wage.
The second cointegrating vector has been normalised to be interpreted
as a price-setting equation, where the price is the relative price between
imports and production.49 We get the following long-run equation:
pI − pp = −283.9(w − q) − 30.79u +1 .058t. (25)
Interpreting a higher wage share, (w − q), as a “cost push”, such a cost
push increases the price of domestic goods in the long run.50 Ar i s ei n
unemployment, a negative “demand shock”51, increases the relative price
47We cannot, however, rule out that the eﬀect equals zero, see Section 6.1.5.
48That is, eﬀects on the wage costs, the implication of which is that taxes in the long
run are borne by wage earners.
49This equation directly corresponds to equation 17 in Section 6.
50Notice, however, that, according to our theoretical framework, this eﬀect works
through changes in the elasticity of product demand.
51It is actually reasonable to label it a demand shock in this model, since our tests
indicate that unemployment is weakly exogenous in the system. One should, however,
keep in mind that we are talking about long-run relationships.
44 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesof domestic goods. According to the price-setting rule in Section 3.1.3, this
implies increasing returns to scale. Finally, the relative price of imports
follows a rising trend. We have no good theory-based explanation to this,
although, as we noted in Section 6.1.1, this is consistent with Swedish
ﬁrms facing increasing competition in the world market. We still feel
(at least somewhat) conﬁdent about the interpretation of this equation,
since the data do not reject the restrictions that potential eﬀects of taxes,
unemployment insurance and labour market programmes go through their
eﬀects on wages.
The third long-run relation has been normalised to be interpreted as
an equation for the replacement rate in the unemployment insurance sys-
tem. Unlike in the two previous equations, we have no theory to base our
interpretations on. Basically, we have derived the equation by putting as
many zero-restrictions on it as possible.52 Written out as an equation for
the replacement rate, it becomes
ρ = −5.238(w − q)+1 .669γ. (26)
Taken at face value, the equation implies that the replacement rate
in the long run is negatively related to the wage share and positively
related to the accommodation ratio. One speculative interpretation of the
positive long-run relationship between the accommodation rate and the
replacement rate is that it reﬂects political preferences: generosity (or lack
of it) towards the unemployed manifests itself both in high replacement
rates and in ambitious ALMPs.
6.1.3 Exogeneity
The second upshot of the cointegration analysis is results concerning weak
exogeneity. As discussed above, a row of zeros in the α matrix implies
that the corresponding variable can be treated as weakly exogenous in
the system. We ﬁnd two such variables: the unemployment rate and the
tax wedge. The latter can be understood as a statement that tax rates
are determined in the political system in a way that is not systematically
related to the variables in our system.
It may at ﬁrst sight seem surprising that the unemployment rate turns
out to be weakly exogenous. Our interpretation of the result is that it
52The restrictions on the other long-run equations are primarily motivated by theor-
etical considerations.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 45may reﬂect the fact that we have not speciﬁed a full equilibrium model:
we have neither imposed any external balance condition nor included any
measure of balance of payments in the empirical analysis. The extension
of the information set induced by adding new variables could turn the
exogeneity result around. This means that, e.g., macroeconomic policies
may inﬂuence the unemployment rate in ways that are given from the
perspective of the model we have set up but not relative to a more general
model.
The exogeneity result is to some extent “good news”, in the sense that,
relative to the variables we analyse, we can condition on the unemployment
rate, which in turn is related to the possibility to identify a wage-setting
equation in the single-equation models we estimate later. On the other
hand, it is not so good news from the perspective of the theoretical model
presented Section 3.
6.1.4 Statistical properties of the system
The inference discussed above is conditional on the system possessing satis-
factory statistical properties. An analysis of these properties is the subject
matter of the present section, where we use the results from the cointeg-
ration analysis to formulate a short-run system for the four endogenous
variables. We have thus imposed weak exogeneity of unemployment and
the tax wedge. In addition to this, we have used the estimated cointeg-
rating vectors and the other restrictions on the α matrix suggested by the
cointegration analysis. Testing these restrictions in the short-run system
conﬁrms the conclusions from the cointegration analysis: the restrictions
on the short-run system implied by the previous analysis are not rejected.
Thus, we feel conﬁdent about conditioning on unemployment and the tax
wedge.
We have, however, not attempted to model the short-run dynamics of
the whole system by looking for contemporary eﬀects of the endogenous
variables. Thus, apart from the long-run relations, which we want to
interpret as structural equations corresponding (in the case of the price-
and wage-setting equations) to equations in our theoretical modelling,
we do not want to give any structural interpretation of our short-run
equations. We mainly estimate them to show that the resulting system
possesses satisfactory statistical properties.
The statistical properties, as measured by tests for residual autocor-
46 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesrelation, normality and heteroscedasticity reveal problems with normality
for the system as a whole, and looking at single equations, the problems
arise in the equation for the relative price. System tests do not indicate
problems with either autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity, although there
is signiﬁcant heteroscedasticity in the equation for the replacement rate.
More information on the estimated system and some of the diagnostic tests
are reproduced in Appendix B. The actual and ﬁtted values and scaled
residuals are reproduced in Figure 12.









































Figure 12: Actual and ﬁtted values and scaled residuals in the dynamic
system
6.1.5 Sensitivity analysis
How robust are the results presented above? We have performed some
“sensitivity analysis”, where we try a number of alternative sets of identi-
fying restrictions. A ﬁrst set of tests pertain to the third cointegrating
relation, where we look for a cointegrating relation with some natural
interpretation. More speciﬁcally, we look for a third cointegrating rela-
tion that can be interpreted as a “budget constraint”. Thus, we look
for a possible negative relationship between the generosity of the unem-
ployment insurance system and the volume of ALMPs, and we want this
trade-oﬀ to be shifted downwards (upwards) by a decreasing (increasing)
tax base. We also analyse the possible diﬀerent wage- and price-setting
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 47relations that pass tests, given the third cointegrating relation presen-
ted in the baseline case above. Our second set of tests assumes that we
instead of three cointegrating vectors have two. Under this assumption
we examine whether our estimated long-run wage-setting relation changes
substantially or is mainly unchanged. In both sets of tests, we restrict the
analysis to restrictions that pass tests and where the ﬁrst two relations
have clear interpretations as wage- and price-setting relations.
Three cointegrating vectors The set-up in the analysis where we
assume that there are three cointegrating vectors is that we impose the
same restrictions on the α-matrix as in the baseline case above. Further-
more, we let the third cointegrating vector be rather “freely” estimated—
we only restrict the analysis to relations where the relative price is ex-
cluded. Brieﬂy, the results are negative with respect to the third coin-
tegrating relation. We never end up with cointegrating vectors that can
be interpreted as budget constraints, and the resulting “cointegrating”
combinations generally look “more” non-stationary than the unrestricted
combination plotted in Figure 10. Fixing the third cointegrating relation
and concentrating on wage- and price-setting relations, we ﬁnd four diﬀer-
ent sets of restrictions that pass tests (including the baseline case above).
In these cases, the coeﬃcient on programme participation either is in the
same magnitude as in the baseline case above or zero. Thus, we ﬁnd a
weak wage-pushing eﬀect of programmes, but we cannot rule out that
there is no eﬀect at all.
Two cointegrating vectors Looking at systems under the assump-
tion of two cointegrating vectors leaves us with three possible systems that
pass all tests. They are fairly similar, and are all characterised by what
we ﬁnd unreasonable point estimates. In particular, we ﬁnd an extremely
strong upward push on wages from the replacement rate in the UI sys-
tem, and a similarly extremely strong wage moderation from ALMPs.53
We ﬁnd these eﬀects too extreme to be taken seriously, and stick to the
case with three cointegrating vectors as our preferred one.
53The point estimates are around -0.3 for programmes and above 1.0 for the replace-
ment rate.
48 IFAU—ALMPs and wages6.2 Concluding comments on the estimated systems
Our main ﬁnding related to wage setting and ALMPs is that there may
be a small wage-raising eﬀect of ALMPs, but we cannot strongly rule out
that the eﬀect equals zero. Furthermore, we have found a long-run eﬀect
of unemployment on wages that is somewhat lower than most previous
estimates. The result that the tax wedge does not matter for wage pressure
in the long run is somewhat at odds with most previous studies, as is the
estimated fairly strong long-run positive covariation between real wages
and the replacement rate in the UI system.
We have also found that both the unemployment rate and the tax
wedge between the product real wage and the consumption real wage are
weakly exogenous with respect to the variables that we have analysed.
The former ﬁnding, which seems fairly robust, implies that we can in fact
identify a structural wage-setting relation in the data.54
On the other hand, some of the estimated eﬀects are non-robust to
changes in speciﬁcations, and we end up with a preferred system where
we can only give some theory-based interpretation of two of the three
identiﬁed cointegrating vectors.
7 Single equations modelling
7.1 Introduction
The main drawback with systems modelling, as discussed above, is that the
limited number of observations severely constrains the number of variables
that can enter the analysis. Our strategy in this section is to look closer
at the wage-setting relation in a single-equation context, making use of
the results from the systems analysis. The analysis in this section will
naturally also draw on the theoretical analysis, where some variables that
were not modelled in the systems context were discussed. Finally, we will
also relate our analysis to earlier attempts to model aggregate Swedish
wage setting with a focus on the role of ALMPs.
Starting with the theoretical analysis, the upshot of equation (12) in
log-linearised form is a wage-setting relation of the following form (letting
54That is, we can trace the eﬀects of changes in unemployment on wage setting
without modelling the unemployment rate. See the discussion in Bean (1994).
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 49lower-case letters represent natural logarithms):
w − pp = a0 + a1q − a2u + a3γ + a4θ + a5(pI − pp)+a6rip+ a7ρ, (27)
where w − pp is the product real wage rate, q productivity, u the unem-
ployment rate, γ the accommodation ratio, θ the tax wedge, (pI −pp)t h e
relative price of imports, rip the measure of residual income progressivity
and ρ the replacement rate in the unemployment insurance system. We
expect all parameters except a1 and a3 (which can be either positive or
negative) to be non-negative.
Our primary interest in equation (27) is in looking at the eﬀect of
ALMPs on wage setting. Thus, we will especially focus on the estimate of
a3. We will both compare this estimate to eﬀects found in earlier studies
and look at the evolution of the parameter over time to determine whether
our ﬁnding in the systems analysis of a rather small eﬀect reﬂects changing
labour market conditions and/or the new policy mix in the 1990s or if it
primarily is driven by diﬀerences in model speciﬁcation or by new data
series.
A number of special cases of equation (27) can be found, either from
theory by imposing restrictions on technology or union objectives, or by
looking at “stylised facts” or empirical ﬁndings in earlier studies. In addi-
tion, a number of policy questions are related to some of these restrictions.
Some of these issues will be brought up in the presentation of the results.
7.2 Empirical speciﬁcation of dynamic baseline model
Following the analysis in previous sections, we treat the variables in equa-
tion (27) as potentially ﬁrst-order integrated. Thus, we must formulate
the econometric model in such a way that non-stationary variables are
transformed into stationary ones. This can be achieved either by tak-
ing ﬁrst-diﬀerences of potentially I(1) variables or by forming stationary
(i.e. cointegrating) combinations of them. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences destroys
valuable long-run information. Hence, our strategy is to ﬁnd stationary
linear combinations of the variables.
This can, in turn, either be achieved by the two-step Engle and Granger
(1987) procedure or by a one-step procedure, where the lagged potentially
cointegrated variables are entered as single explanatory variables in a re-
gression with the dependent variable in ﬁrst-diﬀerence form.
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step approach are better (Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry, 1993),
we follow this approach.55 The baseline transformation we use is the
following56:
∆(w − pp)t = b0 + b1(w − pp)t−1 + b2qt−1 + b3ut−1 + b4γt−1 (28)
+b5θt−1 + b6(pI − pp)t−1 − b7ript−1 + b8ρt−1 +
b9∆qt + b10∆ut + b11∆γt + b12∆θt + b13∆(pI − pp)t
−b14∆ript + b15∆ρt + b16∆(w − pp)t−1 + εt.
This model was estimated by OLS and IV methods, and in both cases
passed diagnostic tests.57 Plots of recursive parameter estimates did not
indicate any substantial problems of parameter instability. Given these
results, we take the estimates of equation (28) as our benchmark for further
testing.
7.3 Results
We start by testing whether the product real wage is unit elastic with
respect to productivity in the long run. This is equivalent to testing the
restriction b1 = −b2.58 This test is passed in both the IV and OLS
55The critical values for the signiﬁcance tests for the lagged levels variables are not
given by the t-distribution; the Dickey-Fuller distribution should be used instead, see
Kremers, Ericsson, and Dolado (1992).
56We have tested and not rejected nominal homogeneity both in the short and in the
long run by using the change in the nominal wage cost as the left-hand side variable
and the producer price on the right-hand side. Thus, we start in a real model.
57The instruments used in the IV estimation were the logged world market oil price
in t and t − 1; the long-run US real interest rate in t an t − 1; ∆qt−1,∆ ut−1;∆ γt−1,
∆θt−1;∆ ript−1;∆ ( pI −p)t−1 and ∆ρt−1. ∆qt, ∆γt, ∆ript and ∆(pI −p)t were treated
as endogenous, given the results of the exogeneity tests in the systems analysis. The
diagnostic tests used were tests for ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation in the resid-
uals (AR(1–2)), ARCH(1), residual normality and a RESET test for heteroskedasticity.
The Sargan test for instrument validity was passed at the 10% level.
58It is often considered to be a stylised fact that wage costs in the long run are unit
elastic with respect to labour productivity. If that is the case, the wage share and
employment will be independent of productivity developments in the long run. This
is, however, a property of the equilibrium of the whole system and not only of the
wage-setting schedule. Nevertheless, we will test the restriction that also the wage-
setting schedule is unit elastic with respect to labour productivity. It is hard to ﬁnd
good theoretical reasons for this restriction, but we feel the fact that it has been tested
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was passed as well. However, the hypothesis that neither taxes nor relative
prices matter for wage costs in the long run (b5 = b6 = 0) in addition to
the restrictions on the eﬀects of productivity was forcefully rejected.60
Imposing the non-rejected restrictions, we can rewrite the model as
∆(w − q)t = b0 + b1(w − q)t−1 + b3ut−1 + b4γt−1 (29)
+b5θt−1 + b6(pI − pp)t−1 − b7ript−1 + b8ρt−1 +
b10∆ut + b11∆γt + b12∆θt + b13∆(pI − pp)t
−b14∆ript + b15∆ρt + b16∆(w − q)t−1 + εt
The results of estimating equation (29) by OLS and IV methods are re-
produced in Tables 4a n d5 .
As the model at this stage is over-parameterised, we defer the discus-
sion of point estimates to the parsimoniously parameterised model that
results from imposing zero-restrictions on the model above. It is, however,
worth noting that the long-run wage-setting relation that can be derived
from the estimates in Table 4 or 5 looks rather diﬀerent than the relation
derived from the systems modelling.61
Sequentially dropping the least signiﬁcant variables, we get the parsi-
monious model in Table 6.62 The restrictions are not rejected by an F-test
(the p-value is 0.84). Judging from the speciﬁcation tests reported in the
table, there are no clear signs of mis-speciﬁcation either. Looking instead
at the graphical output in Figures 13 and 14, we ﬁrst note that the ﬁt is
fairly good, but that the equation has some problems to trace the devel-
opments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More interestingly, however,
the plots of the recursively estimated parameters show very small signs
of changing parameters in the 1990s, with the exception of the estimated
eﬀect of the income-tax progressivity factor. There is a slight upward
without rejection in a number of earlier studies (for example Rødseth and Nymoen
(1999) and Forslund (1995)) is a good enough reason. This restriction was also imposed
rather than tested in our systems analysis.
59The test used was a Wald test. The p-values were 0.37 (IV) and 0.22 (OLS).
60χ
2(4) = 34.843[0.0000]
∗∗ in the OLS model and χ
2(4) = 25.714[0.0000]
∗∗ in the IV
model.
61The estimated eﬀects of ALMPs and the replacement rate are, for example, both
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant in the IV estimation. The sign of the estimated
eﬀect of the replacement rate is even negative.
62OLS results, presented for the sake of comparison, are given in Table 7.
52 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTable 4: OLS estimates
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
Constant -0.674 0.085 -7.972
(w − q)t−1 -0.908 0.122 -7.453
ut−1 -0.043 0.008 -5.570
γt−1 -0.006 0.025 -0.234
θt−1 0.175 0.038 4.557
(pI − pp)t−1 -0.014 0.035 -0.403
ript−1 -0.101 0.043 -2.351
ρt−1 -0.016 0.047 -0.337
∆ut 0.071 0.020 3.623
∆γt 0.031 0.033 0.929
∆θt 0.512 0.107 4.809
∆(pI − pp)t 0.156 0.0592.647
∆ript -0.067 0.035 -1.886
∆ρt -0.028 0.028 -0.989
∆(w − pp)t−1 0.395 0.146 2.702
R2 = 0.886 F(14,21) = 11.66 [0.000] σ =0 .012 DW = 2.20
Information Criteria SC = -7.85 HQ = -8.281 FPE=0.0002
AIC = -8.511
AR 1–2 F( 2, 19) = 0.310 [0.737] ARCH 1 F( 1, 19) = 0.252 [0.622]
Normality χ2(2)= 1.914 [0.384] RESET F( 1, 20) = 1.346 [0.260]
drift in the estimated eﬀect of unemployment, but the conﬁdence interval
is shrinking, implying that the parameter becomes more precisely estim-
ated.63
7.3.1 The point estimates
We now proceed by looking at the implications of the IV point estim-
ates. First, we derive the long-run equation corresponding to the model
in Table 6. This is achieved by setting all variables xt = xt−1 = x.D o i n g
this, we get
(w − q)=−0.716 + 0.162θ − 0.076rip − 0.051u. (30)
63As ALMPs are not included in the parsimonious model, there are no recursive
parameter estimates plotted for this variable. Looking instead at recursive estimates of
the parameters of the full model, the eﬀect of ALMPs is estimated to be close to zero
in all sub-samples from 1988 an onwards. It is also very imprecisely estimated. Thus,
there are no signs of a signiﬁcant change in this (non-)eﬀect.
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
∆(pI − pp)t 0.2890.104 2.773
∆ρt -0.010 0.054 -0.179
∆ript -0.021 0.081 -0.256
∆γt 0.067 0.046 1.463
γt−1 0.003 0.0390.082
(w − q)t−1 -1.054 0.176 -5.986
θt−1 0.190 0.044 4.297
∆θt 0.632 0.143 4.406
(pI − pp)t−1 0.023 0.046 0.486
Constant -0.758 0.113 -6.715
ript−1 -0.066 0.075 -0.874
ut−1 -0.052 0.011 -4.666
ρt−1 -0.0003 0.082 -0.003
∆ut 0.092 0.027 3.378
∆(w − pp)t−1 0.580 0.199 2.906
Additional Instruments used: ∆θt−1 ∆γt−1
US interest rate in t and t − 1 oil price in t and t − 1
∆ut−1
σ =0 . 0 1 4 D W=2 . 2 9R e d u c e dF o r m σ =0 .013
Speciﬁcation χ2(4) =3.237 [0.519] Testing β =0:χ2(14) = 127.68[0.000]∗∗
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 19) = 0.821 [0.455] ARCH 1 F( 1, 19) = 0.844 [0.370]
Normality χ2(2) = 1.408[0.495]
All parameters (except, perhaps, the estimated eﬀect of tax progressivity)
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels.64 An u m b e ro f
interesting observations can be made.
1. We see that there is no long-run eﬀect of ALMPs on real-wage pres-
sure. This is in some contrast to the previous systems results, al-
though we could not preclude that the coeﬃcient also in that case
equals zero. It is also in some contrast to most earlier studies on
aggregate data (see the summary in Section 2). There is, however, a
certain diﬀerence between the speciﬁcation in the present study and
many earlier ones: most previous studies have used the accommoda-
tion ratio and the sum of open unemployment and programme par-
ticipation as regressors, thus holding the sum of unemployment and
64The test statistics are not distributed according to the t-distribution, because the
variables, according to our previous tests, are ﬁrst-order integrated. See footnote 55.
54 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTable 6: IV estimates of parsimonious model
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
∆(pI − pp)t 0.200 0.057 3.499
(w − q)t−1 -0.918 0.104 -8.832
θt−1 0.1490.025 5.9 80
∆θt 0.522 0.091 5.713
Constant -0.657 0.067 -9.736
ript−1 -0.070 0.030 -2.298
ut−1 -0.047 0.007 -6.709
∆ut 0.061 0.013 4.755
∆(w − pp)t−1 0.434 0.114 3.816
Additional Instruments used: ∆θt−1 ∆γt−1
US interest rate in t and t − 1 oil price in t and t − 1
∆ut−1
σ = 0.013 DW = 2.43 Reduced Form σ =0 .014
Speciﬁcation χ2(6) =5.600 [0.469] Testing β =0:χ2(8) = 138[0.000]∗∗
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 19) = 1.322 [0.285] ARCH 1 F( 1, 19) = 1.5243e-006 [0.999]
Normality χ2(2)= 0.156 [0.925]
Table 7: OLS estimates of parsimonious model
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
∆(pI − pp)t 0.163 0.044 3.742
(w − q)t−1 -0.882 0.096 -9.144
θt−1 0.141 0.023 6.076
∆θt 0.496 0.087 5.724
Constant -0.630 0.061 -10.258
ript−1 -0.068 0.030 -2.280
ut−1 -0.046 0.007 -6.727
∆ut 0.058 0.012 4.707
∆(w − pp)t−1 0.404 0.108 3.726
σ =0 . 0 1 3 D W=2 . 3 6 R2 =0 .841
F(8,27)=17.901 [0,0000]
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 25) = 1.179[0.324] ARCH 1 F( 1, 25) = 0.079[0.781]
Normality χ2(2)= 0.171 [0.918]

















Figure 13: Actual and ﬁtted values, scaled residuals, cross plot of actual






































Lagged residual income progressivity
Figure 14: Recursive parameter estimates
programme participation constant. The implied experiment in those
studies hence is a transfer from unemployment to programmes. In-
stead, holding open unemployment constant as in the present study,
the assumption is that the transfer is performed leaving unemploy-
56 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesment unaﬀected. The ﬁnding could, of course, also reﬂect that the
change in programme mix and the dramatically diﬀerent labour mar-
ket situation in the 1990s make a diﬀerence regarding the eﬀects of
ALMPs on wages. However, the results of our recursive estimations
contradict this interpretation.
2. There is no signiﬁcant long-run eﬀect of the replacement rate on wage
pressure. This is much in line with most previous studies, although
very much at odds with the results in our systems modelling.
3. There is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the tax wedge. According to the point
estimate, just above 15% of a rise in the tax wedge contributes to a
long-run wage pressure.
4. The progressivity of the tax system has a long-run eﬀect contrary
to the expected direction. A 10% fall in the coeﬃcient of residual
income progressivity raises wage pressure by approximately 0.75%.
5. Finally, there is a signiﬁcant long-run eﬀect of unemployment on
wage pressure. According to the point estimate, a reduction in un-
employment from 8% to 6% (i.e., by 25%) is in the long run associ-
ated with slightly less than 1.5% higher wage pressure. This eﬀect,
although larger than the one we found in the systems estimations,
is in the lower end of the interval spanned by parameters found in
previous studies. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the higher un-
employment rate in the 1990s has aﬀected the Swedish wage setting
mechanism. This interpretation is, however, to some extent contra-
dicted by the ﬁnding in the recursive estimations, where it is hard
to see signs of any substantial changes in the estimated parameters.
With respect to the short-run dynamics, we ﬁnd the following:
1. Rises in both the tax wedge and the relative import price contribute
signiﬁcantly to an increased wage pressure in the short run. The
estimated elasticities are 0.50 and 0.16, respectively. The point es-
timate of the eﬀect of the tax wedge implies that the burden of higher
taxes in the short run is shared fairly equally between workers (in
the form of reduced consumer real wages) and ﬁrms (in the form of
higher real product wages). This is broadly consistent with earlier
ﬁndings.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 572. The estimated eﬀect of the change in unemployment is positive. This
is somewhat surprising. If the long-term unemployed exert a lower
downward wage pressure than the short-term unemployed, we would
expect the opposite sign. The same conclusion would follow from an
insider-outsider framework. The sign is also opposite the one found
by Forslund (1995).
3. Finally, the positive sign of the eﬀect of the lagged change in the
product real wage rate probably picks up some inertia in the wage-
setting process that we have not modelled, and which manifests itself
as positive serial correlation.
7.3.2 Alternative speciﬁcations of the labour market variables
To facilitate comparisons with earlier studies and to check the robustness
of our results, we now look at two alternative speciﬁcations of the “la-
bour market variables” (the measures of unemployment and programme
participation).
First, as discussed on page 37, most previous studies have used the
sum of open unemployment and programme participation (“total unem-
ployment”) as the measure of the labour market situation. Thus, we also
estimate equations based on the following speciﬁcation of the wage-setting
relation:
w − pp = a1
0 + a1
1q − a1





where ut is the (logged) sum of the open unemployment rate and the
programme participation rate. With this speciﬁcation, a positive coeﬃ-
cient on the accommodation rate (γ) means that the experiment of taking
people out of open unemployment and into programmes, given “total un-
employment”, exerts an upward pressure on wages.
Second, Rødseth and Nymoen (1999) use the total unemployment rate
ut and a measure of programme participation which can be written γa ≡
log(1 − Γ), where Γ ≡ R/(R + U); R is the fraction of the labour force
in programmes and U is the unemployment rate. This gives rise to the
following speciﬁcation:
w − pp = a2







58 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesWith this formulation, it is straightforward to test whether only total
unemployment matters (in which case we have a2
3 =0 )o ri fo n l yo p e n
unemployment matters (in which case we have a2
2 = a2
3).65
Also in this case we derive parsimonious models by sequentially elimin-
ating variables, which, according to tests, are statistically non-signiﬁcant.
We begin by looking at the IV estimates of the model with “total un-
employment” and the accommodation rate, which are displayed in Table 8.
Table 8: IV estimates of parsimonious model with “total unemployment”
and accommodation ratio
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
∆(pI − pp)t 0.285 0.083 3.438
θt−1 0.202 0.044 4.539
Constant -0.690 0.103 -6.684
∆θt 0.708 0.134 5.285
(w − q)t−1 -0.914 0.124 -7.383
utt−1 -0.064 0.010 -6.708
∆(w − pp)t−1 0.494 0.140 3.521
∆utt 0.068 0.0193.59 6
γt−1 0.021 0.016 1.291
Additional Instruments used: ∆θt−1 ∆γt−1
US interest rate in t and t − 1 log oil price in t and t − 1
∆utt−1
σ = 0.015 DW = 1.68 Reduced Form σ =0 .015
Speciﬁcation χ2(6) =6.408 [0.379] Testing β =0:χ2(8) = 92.13[0.000]∗∗
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 25) = 0.455 [0.640] ARCH 1 F( 1, 25) = 0.040 [0.843]
Normality χ2(2) = 2.324[0.313]
Looking at the t-statistic, the eﬀect of the accommodation rate seems
insigniﬁcant. The point estimate is, furthermore, close to zero. Thus,
the eﬀect would in any case be small. Performing F-tests and using the
Schwarz criterion, deletion of the accommodation rate from the equation
is, however, rejected.66 Extracting the long-run equation corresponding
65To see the second property, notice that the partial derivative of the wage share with




3)/(u+r). Thus, the partial
eﬀect of programme participation equals zero in the case referred to in the text.
66Notice, however, that critical values should not be taken from the usual distribu-
tions, see footnote on page 51.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 59to the short-run model in Table 8, we get the following:
(w − q)=−0.755 + 0.221θ − 0.075ut +0 .023γ (33)
Comparing the results regarding the eﬀect of ALMPs with the estim-
ates in Calmfors and Forslund (1990), the elasticity found in the present
study (0.023) is signiﬁcantly lower than the average long-run elasticity
(0.20) found by Calmfors and Forslund (Table 7, pp. 102–03). We will
return to the issue of what accounts for the diﬀerence in results; for now
it suﬃces to point out that recursive parameter estimates do not indicate
any signiﬁcant parameter change occurring after 1986, the stop year of the
analysis in Calmfors and Forslund (1990).
Comparing the other point estimates to the long-run estimates in our
baseline model (equation (30)), we see that the coeﬃcient of residual in-
come progressivity now is found insigniﬁcant, that the point estimate of
the eﬀect of the tax wedge is slightly higher in the present model and
that the long-run eﬀect of “total unemployment” (perhaps surprisingly)
is estimated to be somewhat stronger than the estimated eﬀect of open
unemployment in equation (30).
Next, in Table 9, we look at the speciﬁcation of the labour market
variables introduced by Rødseth and Nymoen (1999). With this formula-
tion, we are ﬁrst interested in whether the coeﬃcient on the programme
variable equals zero. In case it does, open unemployment and programme
participation have the same eﬀect on wage pressure, and only “total un-
employment” matters. Second, in case the coeﬃcient on “total unemploy-
ment” equals the negative of the coeﬃcient on the programme variable,
the partial eﬀect of programmes equals zero and only open unemployment
matters (see footnote 65).
A somewhat disturbing feature of the estimates in Table 9is that the
point estimate of the eﬀect of the lagged dependent variable exceeds unity,
although it cannot be ruled out that the coeﬃcient equals one, in which
case the equation eﬀectively becomes a Phillips curve.
Once again, we ﬁnd that the accommodation rate is insigniﬁcant ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h et-test but also that an F-test and the Schwarz criterion
reject deleting the variable from the equation (but note the caveat on
testing in the presence of non-stationary variables discussed on page 51).
The size of the point estimate also indicates a numerically small eﬀect.67
67Raising the accommodation rate from 30 per cent to 50 per cent at a given level of
“total unemployment” would raise the wage pressure by about 1.5 per cent.
60 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTable 9: IV estimates of parsimonious model with “total unemployment”
and log(1 − Γ)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
∆(pI − pp)t 0.274 0.077 3.542
∆utt 0.082 0.018 4.619
θt−1 0.196 0.043 4.584
ript−1 -0.0690.032 -2.129
γat−1 -0.047 0.028 -1.666
Constant -0.765 0.093 -8.236
∆θt 0.645 0.120 5.365
w − qt−1 -1.044 0.131 -7.945
utt−1 -0.055 0.009-6.178
∆(w − pp)t−1 0.523 0.125 4.177
Additional Instruments used: ∆θt−1 ∆γat−1
US interest rate in t and t − 1 oil price in t and t − 1
∆utt−1
σ = 0.014 DW = 2.22 Reduced Form σ =0 .014
Speciﬁcation χ2(6) =4.331 [0.632] Testing β =0:χ2(9) = 127.21[0.000]∗∗
AR 1- 2 F( 2, 24) = 0.396 [0.678] ARCH 1 F( 1, 24) = 1.059 [0.314]
Normality χ2(2) = 1.253[0.534]
Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence for strong ALMP eﬀects on wage pressure.
Testing whether the coeﬃcients on “total unemployment” and the ac-
commodation rate add up to zero produces a forceful rejection (the p-value
equals 0.0002). Combined with the signiﬁcant eﬀect of total unemploy-
ment, we conclude that total unemployment rather than only open unem-
ployment contributes to wage moderation.
Comparing the results to those in the previous model, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient of residual income progressivity has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in
the present model as opposed to in the model with total unemployment
and the accommodation rate. As in the baseline model, this eﬀect has the
“wrong” sign.
As the long-run solution is not well deﬁned, it is obvious that we cannot
discuss any such results within the framework of the present model.
Finally, once again recursive estimates fail to indicate any serious para-
meter instability occurring during the 1990s.68
68With the exception of the estimated eﬀect of income tax progressivity, which be-
haves in the same way as in the baseline model; the estimated eﬀect of the lagged wage
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lation in our baseline model, it is appropriate to check which model the
data prefers. This can be done formally by applying encompassing tests,
which test whether a chosen model can account for results produced by
other models. Encompassing tests are implemented in PcGive (see Hendry
and Doornik (1996) for the details and Hendry (1995), ch. 14, for a more
general discussion).
We cannot test the baseline model (M1) against the second alternative
model (M3) because the test would involve variables that are perfectly
collinear. We can, however, compare the estimated standard errors of the
models, and doing so we ﬁnd that the estimated standard error for M1 is
lower than for M3.69
Furthermore, we cannot reject that M1 encompasses the ﬁrst altern-
ative speciﬁcation (M2), whereas the opposite is rejected.
Comparing M2 and M3, we reject that the former encompasses the
latter, whereas it cannot be rejected that M3 encompasses M2.
We conclude that there is no compelling reason in terms of encom-
passing to abandon our baseline model in favour of any of the alternatives.
7.4 Static modelling—canonical cointegrating regressions
A problem that is common to both the Johansen procedure and the dy-
namic single-equations modelling is that inference under both methods
relies on correctly speciﬁed dynamics. To the extent that we are inter-
ested in both short-run and long-run relationships, it goes without say-
ing that we have to model both. However, if the main interest lies in
ﬁnding long-run relationships, the short run is modelled mainly to yield
correct inference about the long run. In this perspective, an incorrect
modelling of short-run dynamics may introduce bias and dependence on
“nuisance parameters” into the long-run relationships of interest. Park
(1992) develops a procedure, canonical cointegrating regressions (CCR),
which involves OLS regressions on transformed data. These regressions
yield asymptotically eﬃcient estimators as well as valid inference on coin-
tegrating (long-run) relationships. The data transformations involve only
stationary (short-run) components of a given model.
share is also somewhat unstable.
69This is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for encompassing in linear regression
models, see Hendry (1995), ch. 14.
62 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesAs the method is not so well known, we begin by presenting some of
the main ideas of the approach. Then we present our estimation results.
To ﬁx ideas and introduce the notation of Park (1992), we look at the
time series {xt} and {yt}, generated by
yt = π 
1ct + y0
t (34)
xt =Π  
2ct + x0
t, (35)
where ct is a k-dimensional deterministic sequence and {y0
t} and {x0
t} are
general 1 and m-dimensional I(1) processes. Denote the m+1-dimensional








Under general conditions, Bn converges weakly to a vector Brownian
motion B as n →∞ . Denote the covariance matrix of the limit Brownian
motion by Ω, the long run variance of {wt}.






















t−i) be the covariance function of {wt}. Then the
long run variance of wt is given by Ω =
 +∞
−∞ Ψ(i). Furthermore, Ω may
be decomposed as Ω = Σ + Λ + Λ ,w h e r e





Γ ≡ Σ + Λ (40)
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t} are cointegrated. Then
y0
t = α x0
t + ut, (43)
where ut is stationary. Set
pt =( ut,∆x0 
t ) . (44)
We look at the following regression model:
yt = α xt + et, (45)





   . (46)
In general, the OLS estimator of α is at least
√
n-consistent. Its limiting
distribution is, however, in general non-Gaussian and biased; standard
tests have nonstandard asymptotic distributions and depend on nuisance
parameters.
Now consider the following transformations (CCR):
x∗
t = xt −
 
Σ−1Γ2
   wt (47)
y∗
t = yt −
 
Σ−1Γ2α +( 0 ,ω 12Ω−1
22 )   
wt. (48)
A key result in Park (1992) is that these transformations asymptot-
ically eliminate endogeneity bias caused by long-run correlation of innov-
ations of the stochastic regressors and regression errors as well as bias
from cross correlations between stochastic regressors and regression er-
rors. This, furthermore, means that the asymptotic theory of tests based
on CCR is the same as for classical regression.
The transformations in equations (47) and (48) involve a number of
unknown entities (parameters such as α,Γ,Σ and Ω and the processes







64 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesThe {ˆ et} and ˆ α can be obtained from the regression (45) and the {∆x0
t}
can be obtained from an estimation of equation (35):
xt = ˆ Π 
2ct +ˆ x0
t, (50)
or directly from a regression of {∆xt} on {∆ct}.G i v e n{ ˆ wt},i t sv a r i a n c e






ˆ wt ˆ w 
t. (51)
Consistent estimates of Ω and Γ can be obtained by standard spectrum
estimates. For our estimations, we rely on a kernel estimator implemented
in Gauss code written by Masao Ogaki.70
7.4.1 Results
Once again, the starting point for the empirical analysis is the static model
in equation (27), which we for convenience reproduce below:
w − pp = a0 + a1q − a2u + a3γ + a4θ + a5(pI − pp)+a6rip+ a7ρ. (52)
As a main point of applying CCR is that we do not have to specify
the dynamics, equation (52) is the model we estimate. The results are
displayed in Table 10.
The estimates without any restrictions imposed are reproduced in
column 1. The point estimate of the productivity eﬀect is very close
to unity, and a Wald test does not reject setting the parameter equal to
one. The estimated parameters with the restriction a1 =1i m p o s e da r e
given in column 2 of the table. All variables, except ALMPs and the
replacement rate in the UI system are signiﬁcant at conventional levels
according to t-tests on the parameters in column 2. However, a Wald
test forcefully rejects setting a1 =1 ; a3 = a7 =0o ra1 =1 ; a3 =0 ,
whereas a1 =1 ; a7 = 0 is accepted. The estimates with the latter re-
strictions imposed are given in column 3. This is, according to the tests,
the preferred speciﬁcation. Tests for the presence of deterministic trends
in this model allow us to exclude all deterministic trends of order ≤ 5.
Looking at the point estimates, we note the following:
70The Gauss code, implementing CCR, was most kindly supplied by Per Jansson,
Bank of Sweden.
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Product real wage ratea
123




u −0.033∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.041∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
γ −0.029 −0.022 −0.033∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014)
θ 0.199∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(0.050) (0.027) (0.029)
pI − pp −0.091∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.090∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025)




a Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Double asterisks indicate that the es-
timate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level accordingto t-tests. The
estimated parameters derive from the third-step estimates, whereas Wald tests are
performed using the fourth-step estimates.
b The estimate is imposed.
1. The (highly statistically signiﬁcant) eﬀect of open unemployment
equals −0.04. This, once again, is lower than the eﬀect found in
most previous studies.
2. The eﬀect of ALMPs is negative, thus indicating that, in contrast
to most previous ﬁndings, labour market policies may actually con-
tribute to wage moderation.
3. Higher taxes contribute to wage pressure, also in the long run. The
estimated elasticity with respect to the tax wedge is about 20%.
4. A higher relative import price contributes to wage moderation. The
size of the estimated parameter is just below 10%. Although the
66 IFAU—ALMPs and wagessign may be surprising, we cannot rule it out ap r i o r y .
5. Higher progressivity in the income tax system seems to add to, rather
than reduce, the wage pressure. The size of the elasticity is just
below 15%.
6. Finally, like in most previous studies (but unlike the results in our
systems estimation), we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of the re-
placement rate in the UI system.
8 What accounts for the new results?
We have seen that our results concerning the eﬀect of ALMPs on wage
pressure are somewhat at odds with the main body of previous results,
which indicate that extensive ALMPs tend to increase wage pressure. An
important question is what accounts for this diﬀerence.
Up to now, we have looked at a number of possible explanations: a
longer sample period, diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the labour market variables
and other estimation methods. Neither of these possible explanations have
really provided any clue as to what accounts for the diﬀerence.
We now proceed and look at another two possible explanations: diﬀer-
ent models and diﬀerent data. To accomplish this, we estimate the model
proposed in the inﬂuential papers by Calmfors and Forslund (1990) and
Calmfors and Forslund (1991) on our data set, both using their original
sample period (ending in 1986) and our full sample. If we still do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant eﬀect of ALMPs on wage pressure, our conclusion will be
that (by default) our new results derive from new data.71
The estimated model proposed by Calmfors and Forslund (1990) and
Calmfors and Forslund (1991) is most easily presented in a table with
the estimated parameters. We choose to present two of their diﬀerent
speciﬁcations in Table 11.
There are a number of diﬀerences between our modelling and the mod-
els estimated by Calmfors and Forslund. Here we list a few of those dif-
ferences:
71Unfortunately, the original data used by Calmfors and Forslund are not available;
the main diﬀerences between our data and theirs derive from revisions in the National
Accounts Statistics and new computations of income tax rates. Given their data, we
could have estimated our models on their original data to check for diﬀerences.
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a The numbers in the parentheses are (absolute) t-values. ∆
2pc is the change of the
change in the log of the consumer price index, which approximately equals the change
in the inﬂation rate and t is time.
1. The speciﬁcation of “total unemployment” is slightly diﬀerent (roughly
corresponding to the unlogged rate; log(1 + U + R) ≈ (U + R)f o r
small numbers).72 This would roughly imply that a change in total
unemployment from 1 per cent to 2 per cent would have the same
eﬀect as a change from 5 per cent to 6 per cent.
2. All trends are assumed to be deterministic in model 1i nTable 11;
in model 2 the whole question of non-stationarity is ignored.
3. Calmfors and Forslund introduce the change in the inﬂation rate to
capture expectational errors in wage setting. We have not used any
counterpart to that variable in the present study.
72R is the fraction of the labour force in ALMPs.
68 IFAU—ALMPs and wages4. Calmfors and Forslund lump the tax and the price part of the wedge
between the product real wage rate and the consumption real wage
rate together; we add them separately.
In Table 12 we show the results of re-estimating the two models in
Table 11 using our data set (both for the period 1960–86 and the period
1960–1997). We do this using IV methods and the instruments sugges-
ted by Calmfors and Forslund (1990). Unemployment is treated as an
endogenous variable, whereas the accommodation rate is assumed to be
an exogenously given policy variable.
Table 12: The models of Calmfors and Forslund (1990) re-estimated on new
dataa
Variable 1a: 1960–97 1b: 1960-86 2a: 1960–97 2b: 1960–86
const 3.335 3.357 -0.078 0.087
(25.21) (23.25) (0.214) (0.126)
log(1 + r + u) 0.676 -0.865 -0.648 -4.536
(1.318) (0.414) (1.076) (1.821)
γ -0.048 0.060 0.067 0.114
(0.828) (0.890) (1.647) (1.579)
θ -0.0790.372 0.077 0.175
(1.305) (2.816) (1.410) (1.940)
∆2pc 0.218 -0.424 -0.173 -0.552
(0.895) (1.188) (0.657) (1.318)
t 0.0890.087
(9.492) (8.387)




a The numbers in the parentheses are (absolute) t-statistics. Total unemployment, the
tax-price wedge and productivity have been treated as endogenous variables; public
employment, the labour force the logs of the income tax rate, the payroll tax rate and
the VAT have been used as instruments (as have the trend and the squared trend).
Looking ﬁrst at the estimated eﬀect of ALMPs in Table 12, we see that,
even ignoring potential problems of inference related to non-stationarity,
the eﬀect is never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The point estimates
are also in all cases lower than their counterparts in Table 11. This holds
irrespective of sample period and speciﬁcation. Looking at diﬀerent tests
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indications of mis-speciﬁcations in all four equations.73
It is also fairly easy to see that the point estimates are unstable between
speciﬁcations and sample periods. Hence, we do not comment any further
on the point estimates.
Let us summarise: Comparing the estimates of the model of Calmfors
and Forslund on their original data with the estimates on our new data set,
they are very diﬀerent.74 Given the point of departure for this exercise,
we, hence, believe that the diﬀerence between our results and the results
in earlier studies primarily reﬂect new data.
Which, then, are the main novelties in our data set? First,w eh a v e
computed a completely new income tax rate series. Second,a l lt h ed a t a
that derive from the National Accounts Statistics have undergone several
revisions since the late 1980s, some of which have resulted in substantially
revised series for a number of variables in especially the 1980s. Appar-
ently, these changes have meant a lot to the estimates of aggregate wage
equations.
9 Concluding comments
In this paper, the main issue is the eﬀect of ALMP participation on ag-
gregate wage pressure in the Swedish economy. To analyse this issue, we
estimate wage-setting schedules on data for the Swedish private sector us-
ing three diﬀerent estimation strategies: we use Johansen’s (1988) FIML
method to estimate a long-run wage-setting schedule in the framework of a
system of equations; we estimate a single-equation error-correction model;
and, ﬁnally, we look for a long-run wage-setting schedule using Park’s
(1992) notion of canonical cointegrating regressions. A natural way to
look at the results is to compare the estimates derived via these three
routes. This is done in Table 13.
Comparing the three sets of estimates, we ﬁnd both diﬀerences and
similarities. Especially the two single-equation methods produce rather
73An example is that the Durbin-Watson statistic in equation 1a equals 0.66, that
the Sargan test rejects instrument validity and that there is signiﬁcant ARCH 1 and
heteroskedasticity in the same equation.
74We have not used exactly the same estimation technique as Calmfors and Forslund
(they used an iterative three-stage least squares method), so this could still make a
small diﬀerence.
70 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTable 13: Estimated long-run wage-setting schedules. Dependent vari-
able: Labour’s share of value addeda
Variable Johansen Error correction CCR
Unemployment (u) −0.026 −0.051 −0.041
Accommodation rate (γ)0 .067 0 −0.033
Tax wedge (θ)0 0 .162 0.205
Relative import price (pI − pp)0 0 −0.090
Tax progressivity (rip) −− 0.076 −0.167
Replacement rate (ρ) 0.316 0 0
a All variables are in logs. Johansen denotes the results of the Johansen FIML
estimations, Error correction the estimated error-correction model and CCR the
canonical cointegrating regression results.
similar results.
First, regarding the eﬀects of ALMPs on wage pressure, two of the
three point estimates point to no eﬀect or a negative eﬀect, much in con-
trast to earlier results. The third point estimate, resulting from the pre-
ferred Johansen procedure, is positive, but we can impose a zero restriction
in a similar set-up. Hence, most of the evidence is consistent with ALMPs
exerting no upward pressure on the wage-setting schedule. This may re-
ﬂect changes in the labour market or the labour market policies and would
be consistent with a notion that “low-budget” ALMPs with low compens-
ation to participants and small if any positive eﬀects on the probability
of ﬁnding a job do not contribute to an increased wage pressure. This
idea is, however, at odds with the ﬁnding in the recursive estimations of
the error-correction model that the parameter is fairly constant since the
late 1980s, close to zero and imprecisely estimated for all sub-samples we
looked at.
Second, the wage-setting schedule is, according to all estimated models,
negatively sloped: there is a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of unemployment
on the real wage rate. The point estimates are rather low (ranging between
−0.026 and −0.051) compared to the results in earlier studies, but, once
again, recursive parameter estimates in the error-correction model did
not reveal any signs of parameter instability with respect to the eﬀect of
unemployment on wages.
Third, according to the two single-equation estimates, taxes contribute
to long-run wage pressure: raising the tax wedge by 10% contributes to
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 71an increase in wage pressure by between 1.5% and 2% according to the
point estimates. According to the systems estimates, on the other hand,
there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Fourth, in two of the three models there is no impact of relative im-
port prices on wages. In the third, the canonical cointegrating regressions
model, there is a signiﬁcant downward eﬀect on wage pressure from higher
import prices.
Fifth, a higher income-tax progressivity, i.e., a lower coeﬃcient of resid-
ual income progressivity, contrary to what we expect from theory, results
in higher wage pressure according to two of the three estimated models
(the residual income progressivity measure was not included in the Jo-
hansen estimates). The recursive estimates of the error-correction model,
however, indicate some parameter instability occurring in 1991, the year
of the comprehensive tax reform.
Finally, the replacement rate in the UI system is signiﬁcant (with the
expected sign) only in the Johansen estimates. Although not consistent
with our theoretical framework, this is a standard ﬁnding.
Having seen that the diﬀerent methods produce (slightly) diﬀerent
results, what should we believe in? First, given that diﬀerent estimators
behave diﬀerently under diﬀerent conditions, we feel inclined to believe
most in the results that are common to all modelling eﬀorts. This would
leave us most conﬁdent about the results pertaining to the eﬀect of ALMPs
and unemployment. Second, given that we have a small sample, there are
reasons to interpret the results of the Johansen estimates with some care,
partly because the number of degrees of freedom is smaller than for the
other methods, partly because we would need a Monte-Carlo evaluation of
the properties of the tests in this situation. Thus, we tend to believe more
in the single-equation estimates. This belief is further reinforced by our
problems with identifying cointegrating relations with clear theory based
interpretations in the Johansen analysis. Thus, we tend to believe more
in the results pertaining to taxes (derived in the single-equation models)
than in the (theory-consistent) result for the replacement rate derived in
the Johansen analysis.
Our result regarding the eﬀect of ALMPs on wage pressure are at odds
with the results in a majority of the previous studies of aggregate Swedish
wage setting. To see what accounts for this diﬀerence, we have performed
a systematic comparison between our estimated models and the models
estimated by Calmfors and Forslund (1990). We have also experimented
72 IFAU—ALMPs and wageswith diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the measures of the ALMPs.
These exercises have shown that our baseline speciﬁcation stands up
well to alternative speciﬁcations found in the literature. Our prime suspect
behind the diﬀerences in results instead turns out to be data revisions.
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A The data
A1 Introduction
In this appendix a rather detailed description of the data used in the study
is provided. Thus, the description includes information on time-series and
other properties of the variables in addition to graphs, deﬁnitions, data
sources and, when applicable, the methods used to derive the variables.75
Our data set consists of annual data over the period 1960–1997. We use
annual data partly to cover as long a time span as possible in order to
be able to discuss long-run properties of the variables, partly because
there is no variation during a year in some of our variables (for example
the income tax rates) and partly to avoid measurement errors in higher-
frequency series. The information is presented by variable (or group of
variables).
A1.1 A digression on data description
When describing time series data, there are a number of obvious things
to report. First, plots of data against time give a good intuition for their
characteristic properties (at least for the trained observer): one can see if
a variable appears to be trended, if there are variations both in the short
and in the long run, if there seem to be breaks between diﬀerent ”regimes”
and so on. Thus, we plot the data. It is also useful to learn something
about the unconditional distribution of a variable, disregarding the time
dimension. In particular, it is valuable for the sake of inference to ﬁnd out
how far from normally distributed a variable is. To account for this, we
plot a smoothed transformation of the density function and compare it to
a normal distribution both by way of graphs and a formal normality test.
Finally, the time series properties of a variable are of crucial importance
for the possible ways of modelling its variations over time. We describe
the time series properties of variables by plots of correlograms and spectral
densities. This is supplemented by formal unit-root tests. The unit-root
75The plots and the descriptive statistics have been produced using Ox 2.0 (Doornik,
1998) and PcGive 9.10 (Hendry and Doornik, 1996). The plots have been included in
encapsulated post-script format.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 79tests are ADF tests, where the strategy has been to include both a con-
stant and a trend in the test equations in the cases where the time-series
plots suggest the possibility of a trended series. The number of lags has
been chosen as the minimum number of lags necessary to produce error
terms without signiﬁcant serial correlation.76
A2 Wages
The nominal wage measure used pertains to the business sector and is
generated as the ratio between the total wage sum (including employers’
contributions to social security, henceforth called payroll taxes) and the
total number of hours worked by employees in the business sector. To
get the product real wage, the wage series is deﬂated by a measure of
producer prices. The price series used is the implicit deﬂator for value
added in the business sector at producer prices. The data are taken from
the National Accounts statistics.77 The use of the National Accounts
statistics is dictated by our wish to cover the whole business sector, for
which no direct measure of the hourly wage rate is available for our period.
A2.1 The nominal wage cost
The nominal hourly wage cost (panel 1) along with its correlogram (panel
2), spectral density (panel 3), density (panel 4) and a “QQ-plot” com-
parison with a normal distribution (panel 5) are plotted in Figure A1.78
The logarithmic transformation and its ﬁrst diﬀerence are displayed in
Figures A2 and A3. The hourly wage cost is clearly upward trended and
highly serially correlated with most of its spectral density at low frequen-
cies. It is also far from normally distributed. The same is true of its
logarithm. This is, hardly surprising, corroborated by formal normality
tests in Table A1. Neither is it surprising that unit roots in the levels or
log series cannot be rejected, whereas the logarithmic diﬀerence seems to
76For a good discussion of unit-root testing and other issues related to the modelling
of non-stationary time series, see Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry (1993).
77Numbers from reports N 1975:98, N1981:2, N 10 1985 and N 10 1997 from Statistics
Sweden have been chained. This procedure has been followed for all series based on the
National Accounts. All data for 1997 are taken from preliminary ﬁgures published by
the National Institute for Economic Research (Analysunderlag v˚ aren 1998).
78Details of the computations underlying the graphs can be found in Hendry and
Doornik (1996).
80 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesbe stationary (cf. Table A2). Looking at the logarithmic diﬀerence, the
mid 1970s stand out as an exceptional episode with wage cost increases
by around 15% a year between 1974 and 1976. It is also rather interesting
that the two devaluations in 1981 and 1982 by around 25% are followed
by rather modest increases in wage costs.
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Figure A1: Hourly wage cost 1961–97



















Figure A2: Log hourly wage cost 1961–97
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Figure A3: Change in log hourly wage cost 1961–97
A2.2 The product real wage
Figure A4 depicts the development of the (natural) logarithm of the
product real wage rate 1961–1997 along with the same types of graphs
describing its distribution that were used to describe the nominal wage
cost. Corresponding information on its logarithmic change (the growth
rate) is given in Figure A5. The product real wage is deﬁned as the ra-
tio between hourly wage cost (including payroll taxes) and the deﬂator
for value added in the business sector at producer prices. The product
real wage rate is the relevant price index of labour costs for a ﬁrm in the
business sector. The net real take-home hourly wage rate for an employee
can be derived from the product real wage rate by dividing it by a tax-
price wedge reﬂecting payroll taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and the









where W is the wage rate, rwp the product real wage rate, rwc the
consumption real wage rate, t the payroll tax rate, Pp the producer price
82 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesindex, at the average income tax rate and Pc the consumer price index.
The wedge between the product real wage and the consumption real wage
is consequently given by






where   θ denotes the wedge.
If we, for simplicity, assume that consumer prices are a weighted aver-
age of domestic prices and import prices (PI) and take account of value-
added taxes (VA T), the consumer price can be written
Pc =( 1+VA T)Pλ
p P1−λ
I , (A4)
where λ is the weight of domestic goods in the consumer price index.
Thus, the wedge can be decomposed into a part reﬂecting taxes
θ =
(1 + t)(1 + VA T)
1 − at
, (A5)
where θ w i l lb er e f e r r e dt oa st h et a xw e d g e ,a n dap a r tr e ﬂ e c t i n gt h e
relative price between imports and production. The tax wedge, in turn,
can be decomposed into a value-added tax factor, (1 + VA T), a payroll
tax factor, (1 + t), and an income tax factor, (1 − at).
We do not look explicitly at the consumption real wage rate, but the
tax-price wedge and its components are presented in Section A6 below.
Looking at the ﬁrst panel in Figure A5, it seems that product real
wage growth went down around 1980. The levels series in Figure A4 is,
however, clearly upward trended over the period. From the correlogram
in the second panel of Figure A4, we see that the series is characterised
by a very long memory, the autocorrelations hardly dropping below unity
during the 10 years reported in the ﬁgure. The spectral density reported in
the third panel of Figure A4 also reveals that most mass is concentrated
at low frequencies. In the fourth panel the density is plotted and an
interpolated density is compared to a normal density. The distribution is
easily seen to be right-skewed with a very thick left tail. This is also seen
in the ﬁfth panel, where the straight line is the normal distribution.
Looking instead at the rate of change of the product real wage in Fig-
ure A5, the correlogram indicates some serial correlation, the size of which,
however, being far smaller than for the series in levels. The spectrum of
the logarithmic change series is also much ﬂatter, indicating a series that
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 83is “closer“ to white noise. Finally, neither the ﬁgure nor Table A1 indicate
signiﬁcant deviations from normality.
As both the levels and the (logarithmic) change series exhibit beha-
viour that indicates the possible presence of a trend, the unit root tests
include a constant and a trend to allow for the possibility of a deterministic
trend. In the (logged) levels equation with the trend term present, a unit
root is not rejected, whereas the test equation with constant but without
trend rejects a unit root. Testing the levels series without a constant and
a trend does not, however, lead to a rejection of a unit root. The same
test for the change series still rejects the unit root. A tentative conclusion
would be that the product real wage is non-stationary, possibly with a
deterministic trend.
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Figure A4: Log product real wage 1961–97
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Figure A5: Change in log product real wage 1961–97
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 85A2.3 Labour’s share of value added
One possible ”explanation” of the failure to reject non-stationarity for
the product real wage rate is that it may be cointegrated with labour
productivity (which is trended and possibly non-stationary, see below).
Such cointegration, with cointegrating vector (1,−1) between the log of
the product real wage and the log of labour productivity, would e.g. follow
if wages are set in Nash bargains under certain conditions (Layard, Nickell,








or the ratio between the product real wage and labour productivity. Hence,
if the log of the product real wage rate and the log of labour productivity
are cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,−1), the log of the labour
share of value added should be stationary. To check this, we examine the
properties of the labour share in Figures A6 and A7 and Tables A1 and
A2.
The labour share is upward trended from the early 1960s to the early
1980s. Following the two devaluations in 1981 and 1982 as well as in
the aftermath of the depreciation of the Krona in the early 1990s, the
share falls very rapidly. The series is characterised by a fair deal of serial
correlation as witnessed by the correlogram and the spectral density in
Figure A6. The serial correlation is, however, much lower than for the
product real wage rate. Normality is not rejected. Most of the serial
correlation is taken away by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the series, as can be seen
in the correlogram and spectral density of the logarithmic diﬀerence of
the labour share in Figure A7. Also the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series seems to
be well described as normally distributed. The unit-root tests reported
in Table A2, however, suggest that the labour share of value added is an
I(1) variable. This, in turn, indicates that the real wage rate and labour
productivity are not cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,−1).
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Figure A6: Log labour share of value added 1961–1997
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Figure A7: Change in log labour share of value added 1961–1997






Hourly wage cost 69.10 5.28 0.55 12.71 [0.002]
Change in hourly wage cost 4.56 3.28 0.86 6.54 [0.038]
Log hourly wage cost 3.81 1.01 -0.25 7.59[0.022]
Change in log hourly wage cost 0.087 0.036 0.091.76 [0.415]
Log product real wage rate 4.67 0.32 -0.82 13.97 [0.001]
Change in log product real wage rate 0.032 0.029–0.34 1.52 [0.467]
Log labour share of value added -0.35 0.04 –0.02 0.45 [0.796]
Change in log of labour share of value added 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.89[0.640]








Hourly wage cost 1 yes -2.145 -3.574
Change in hourly wage cost 0 yes -3.210 -3.551
Change in hourly wage cost 0 no -2.575 -2.953
Log hourly wage cost 1 yes -0.072 -3.547
Log hourly wage cost 1 no -1.989 -2.953
Change in log hourly wage cost 0 yes -2.891 -3.551
Change in log hourly wage cost 0 no -2.066 -2.953
Log product real wage rate 0 yes -1.979 -3.547
Log product real wage rate 0 no -4.308** -2.953
Change in log product real wage rate 0 yes -4.322** -3.551
Change in log product real wage rate 0 no -3.601* -2.953
Log labour share of value added 1 yes -2.443 -3.547
Log labour share of value added 1 no -2.224 -2.953
Change in log of labour share of value added 0 yes -4.410** -3.551
Change in log of labour share of value added 0 no -4.369** -2.953
88 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesA3 Unemployment
The number of unemployed persons is the standard measure given by the
Labour Force Surveys (LFS) performed by Statistics Sweden.79 This num-
ber of persons is turned into an unemployment rate by relating it to the
labour force. The measure of the labour force is not the one supplied by the
LFS. Instead, the labour force is derived as the sum of employment accord-
ing to the National Accounts statistics, unemployment according to the
LFS and participation in active labour market policy measures (ALMPs)
according to statistics from the National Labour market Board.80 This
“non-standard“ deﬁnition of the labour force is used ﬁrst because the LFS
measure is not available prior to 1963 and second because it seems natural
to include programme participants, as active job search and joblessness
are necessary conditions for programme eligibility.
Figure A8 reproduces the development of the unemployment rate and
the same graphs characterising its distribution as were displayed for the
product real wage. Figure A10 gives the same information about the
logged unemployment rate and Figures A9and A11 about the changes in
the level and log unemployment rates respectively.
The variation in the unemployment rate is completely dominated by
the dramatic rise in the early 1990s. Prior to this the series exhibits a clear
cyclical pattern with every peak slightly higher than its predecessor. The
correlogram and the graph of the spectral density both show that there is a
great deal of persistence in the series (see Figures A8 and A10). The high
autocorrelation at 10 years most likely reﬂects that the three episodes with
the largest increases in the unemployment rate have taken place at ten-
year intervals in the early 1970s, 80s and 90s. The serial correlations in the
ﬁrst-diﬀerence series (Figures A9and A11) are lower, but still signiﬁcant.
Neither the levels, the log series nor their ﬁrst diﬀerences are even close
to being normally distributed (as revealed by the graphs and conﬁrmed
by the formal tests in Table A3). Among other things, this reﬂects the
fact that the development of the unemployment rate seems asymmetric:
although the level of unemployment is signiﬁcantly higher at the end of
the sample period than at the beginning, there are fewer observations at
79Due to changes in both deﬁnitions and methods of measurement, there are breaks
in the LFS unemployment series. The present series is chained by multiplying the old
series by the ratio between it and the new one at common observations.
80Only those programme participants who are not included among the employed are,
of course, added.
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 89which the unemployment rate has increased than decreased (Br¨ ann¨ as and
Ohlsson, 1999).
Unit roots cannot be rejected in levels, even allowing for a determ-
inistic trend, whereas they are rejected for the series in ﬁrst-diﬀerence
form. This would indicate that the unemployment rate behaves like an
I(1) series in our sample period. This should not be taken too literally,
especially concerning the levels series, which is bounded by 0 and 1, and
hence its variance cannot grow indeﬁnitely as time goes to inﬁnity.81 It
is also important to remember that the failure to reject the null of non-
stationarity does not entail accepting a unit root; it may, for example,
reﬂect other forms of non-modelled non-stationarity such as regime shifts.
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Figure A8: Unemployment rate (share of labour force) 1961–97
81T h eva r i a n c eo fa n I(1) process yt = yt−1 + ut grows as tσ
2 if the variance of ut
equals σ
2.




















Figure A9: Change in the unemployment rate 1961–97
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Figure A10: Log unemployment rate 1961–97
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Figure A11: Change in the log of the unemployment rate 1961–97
92 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesDue to the large volumes of active labour market programmes (ALMPs),
the open unemployment rate gives an incomplete picture of the extent of
joblessness in the Swedish economy. Because of this and because the role
of ALMPs is one of the key factors of interest in our study of aggregate
Swedish wage setting, we reproduce information about a measure of ”total
unemployment” in the Swedish economy (derived by adding the particip-
ation rate in ALMPs to the open unemployment rate) in levels, logs and
logarithmic diﬀerences in Figures A12, A13, A14 and A15 and Table A3
below. We also present measures of ALMPs below in Section A4.
Apart from the obvious fact that the total unemployment rate exceeds
the open unemployment rate, the general characteristics of the two series
are very similar. Thus, there is a great deal of persistence, the distribution
is skewed, a unit root cannot be rejected in the levels series, whereas it
can in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series in both the original and logged series.
The conclusion is that also the total unemployment rate behaves as an
I(1) series (see Table A4).
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Figure A12: Total unemployment rate (share of labour force) 1960–97
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Figure A13: Log total unemployment rate 1960–97
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Figure A14: Change in total unemployment rate 1961–1997
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Figure A15: Change in log total unemployment rate 1961–1997






Unemployment rate 0.028 0.020 1.75 80.19[0.000]
Change in the unemployment rate 0.002 0.007 2.35 52.49[0.000]
Log unemployment rate -3.766 0.5491.20 24.01 [0.000]
Change in the log of the unemployment rate 0.0390.223 0.9 4 10.44 [0.005]
Total unemployment rate 0.046 0.030 1.56 49.94 [0.000]
Change in total unemployment rate 0.002 0.010 1.87 25.80 [0.000]
Log total unemployment rate -3.250 0.5390.78 7.23 [0.027]
Change in log total unemployment rate 0.044 0.203 0.86 6.97 [0.031]
Accommodation ratio 0.398 0.084 –0.62 2.88 [0.237]
Change in accommodation ratio 0.003 0.048 –0.26 0.84 [0.658]
Log accommodation ratio -0.949 0.244 –1.38 11.87 [0.003]
Change in log accommodation ratio 0.015 0.127 0.01 0.08 [0.961]
Programme participation rate 0.018 0.010 1.04 10.24 [0.006]
Change in programme participation rate 0.001 0.005 0.64 5.21 [0.074]
Log programme participation rate -4.199 0.621 -0.43 1.55 [0.461]
Change in log programme participation rate 0.0590.2290.266 0.9 7 [0.614]








Unemployment rate 1 yes -2.297 -3.547
Unemployment rate 1 no -1.110 -2.953
Change in the unemployment rate 0 yes -3.368 -3.551
Change in the unemployment rate 0 no -3.311* -2.953
Log unemployment rate 1 yes -3.018 -3.547
Log unemployment rate 1 no -1.489-2.9 53
Change in the log of the unemployment rate 1 yes -4.479** -3.551
Change in the log of the unemployment rate 1 no -4.453** -2.953
Total unemployment rate 3 yes -2.656 -3.547
Total unemployment rate 3 no -0.929 -2.953
Change in total unemployment rate 5 yes -4.774** -3.561
Change in total unemployment rate 1 no -4.821** -2.953
Log total unemployment rate 5 yes -4.224* -3.556
Log total unemployment rate 3 no -0.630 -2.953
Change in log total unemployment rate 1 yes -5.225** -3.551
Change in log total unemployment rate 1 no -5.314** -2.953
Accommodation ratio 0 yes -2.104 -3.547
Accommodation ratio 0 no -2.282 -2.953
Change in accommodation ratio 0 yes -6.555** -3.551
Change in accommodation ratio 0 no -6.083** -2.953
Log accommodation ratio 0 yes -1.999 -3.547
Log accommodation ratio 0 no -2.333 -2.953
Change in log accommodation ratio 3 yes -4.365** -3.551
Change in log accommodation ratio 0 no -6.141** -2.953
Programme participation rate 2 yes -4.054* -3.547
Programme participation rate 1 no -2.188 -2.953
Change in programme participation rate 2 yes -5.278** -3.551
Change in programme participation rate 2 no -5.327** -2.953
Log programme participation rate 1 yes -3.633* -3.547
Log programme participation rate 1 no -2.043 -2.953
Change in log programme participation rate 1 yes -4.516** -3.551
Change in log programme participation rate 1 no -4.517** -2.953
96 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesA4 Labour market programme participation
The rate of ALMP participation (as a fraction of the labour force) is
described in Figures A16, A17 and A18, which contain information on
the original series, its log transformation and its logarithmic change. The
programmes include the major ones administered by the National Labour
Market Board. Until 1984 these are labour market training and relief
work. In 1984 youth programmes and recruitment subsidies are added.
During the 1990s a vast number of new programmes were introduced. Of
these, we have included training replacement schemes, workplace introduc-
tion (API) and work experience schemes (ALU). ALMP participation is
clearly upward trended over our sample period. Until the mid 1980s this
primarily reﬂects a steady growth in training programmes, whereas the
rapid growth in the early 1990s reﬂects the growth of participation in sev-
eral programmes in the wake of the rapid increase in unemployment. The
series is strongly serially correlated, as witnessed by both the correlogram
and the spectral density. It is also far from normally distributed. The
same basic observations also hold for the series in log form, although it is
closer to being normally distributed. Diﬀerencing the log series removes
most of the serial correlation, but the diﬀerenced series is bimodal and not
even close to normality. Given the visible trend in the series, the preferred
unit-root test includes both trend and constant in the test equation. The
results in Table A4 then suggest that the programme participation rate
(both in levels and logs) may be stationary around a deterministic trend.
Another way to look at the volume of ALMPs is to relate it to the
sum of open unemployment and ALMP participation. This measure, often
called the accommodation ratio, both captures the degree to which policy
makers accommodate increases in the number of jobless persons through
ALMPs a n dt h el i k e l i h oodf o raj o bs e e k e rt oe n du pi nap r o g r a m m er a t h e r
than in open unemployment. ALMPs are likely to aﬀect wages through
both these channels (Calmfors and Forslund, 1990; Calmfors and Lang,
1995). The accommodation ratio in level, log and logarithmic diﬀerence
form is displayed in Figures A19, A20 and A21.
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Figure A16: ALMP participation 1961–1997
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Figure A17: Log ALMP participation 1961–1997
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Figure A18: Change in log ALMP participation 1961–1997
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Figure A19: Accommodation ratio 1961–1997
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Figure A20: Log accommodation ratio 1961–1997
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Figure A21: Change in log accommodation ratio 1961–1997
100 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesA5 Labour productivity
Labour productivity is measured as the value added at producer prices per
hour worked (including hours worked by employers and self-employed) in
the business sector. All data derive from the National Accounts statistics.
Productivity in the business sector exhibits extremely high serial cor-
relation: the correlogram shows no visible drop during the period displayed
in Figure A22 and the spectrum has most of its mass concentrated at low
frequency. The series is also clearly trended, with a tendency to slower
growth after the ﬁrst 15 years or thereabouts of the sample period. The
distribution is somewhat skewed to the right and signiﬁcantly non-normal
(Figure A22 and Table A5). Unit-root tests were performed both with
constant and trend and with a constant only (Table A6 below). In the
test equations with both constant and trend included, a unit root was
never rejected. In the displayed equations with only the constant, a unit
root is rejected in the preferred equation. Thus, the conclusions regarding
stationarity are not totally clear cut.
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Figure A22: Log productivity in the business sector 1961–1997
Looking at the rate of change of productivity, we ﬁnd much less of
persistence, as witnessed both by the correlogram and the spectrum.
The series also appears fairly normal (Figure A23 and Table A5). Non-
stationarity of the series is rejected in test equations both with and without
at r e n d( Table A6). Results regarding the order of integration are, how-
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 101Table A5: Normality tests labour productivity
Variable Mean Std. Devn. Skewness Normality χ2
Log productivity 5.03 0.32 -0.64 8.02 [0.018]
Change in log productivity 0.032 0.020 0.190.65 [0.722]
ever, due to the results concerning the non-diﬀerenced series not conclus-
ive.
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Figure A23: Change in log productivity in the business sector 1961–1997







Log labour productivity 0 yes -3.242 -3.547
Log labour productivity 2 no -3.269* -2.953
Change in log labour productivity 0 yes -3.959* -3.551
Change in log labour productivity 0 no -3.690** -2.953
102 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesA6 Taxes
The taxes in our data set are income taxes, payroll taxes and indirect
taxes, i.e., the tax components of the tax-price wedge between product
and consumption real wages. There are many possible ways to compute
taxes, so we go into some detail to describe how ours have been derived.
A6.1 Income tax rates
As the Swedish tax system has been characterised by a rather high degree
of progressivity over large parts of our sample period, we have computed
average as well as marginal tax rates. This is a non-trivial task in several
respects.
First, a decision has to be taken regarding the income at which tax
rates are evaluated. Here we have chosen to use the average annual labour
income in the business sector implied by the total wage sum (excluding
payroll taxes) and the number of persons employed in the sector according
to the National Accounts statistics. Our reason for this choice is consist-
ency with our wage rate measures, which pertain to the average of the
business sector.
Second, given our measure of annual income we have used information
from the tax code and ﬁlled out income-tax return forms under the as-
sumption that our hypothetical wage earner is living alone, has no capital
income and has made only standard deductions.
This has produced a measure of an average income tax rate that is
used in Figure A24 below, which depicts the log of the income tax factor,
(1 − at), where at is the average tax rate. According to our measure,
income taxes rose rapidly during the 1960s, then stayed fairly constant
over the next 20 years. The tax reform of the early 1990s implied a
large reduction in the tax rate, but the development since then has again
produced a signiﬁcantly higher average tax rate. The ADF tests reported
in Table A8 suggest that the average income tax rate is stationary over our
sample period, although the series exhibits fairly high serial correlation as
indicated by the correlogram and the spectral density in Figure A24.
We have also computed a point estimate of marginal income tax rates
pertaining to the tax bracket at which the average tax rate is computed.
This marginal tax rate is used to derive a measure of the progressivity, the
coeﬃcient of residual income progressivity, RIP, deﬁned as the elasticity
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Figure A24: Log income tax factor 1961–1997
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0
.05


















Figure A25: Change in log income tax factor 1961–1997
104 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTable A7: Normality tests for tax variables
Variable Mean Std. Devn. Skewness Normality χ2
Log tax wedge 0.753 0.157 -0.464 7.246∗∗
Change in log tax wedge 0.011 0.030 -0.060 0.185
Log residual income progressivity -0.2690.134 0.346 1.101
Change in log residual income progressivity 0.006 0.087 0.971 20.275∗∗
Log payroll tax factor 0.208 0.110 -0.34923 .306∗∗
Change in log payroll tax factor 0.007 0.014 0.7694.176
Log income tax factor -0.421 0.046 0.6697 .320∗
Change in log income tax factor -0.002 0.028 1.299 12.784∗∗
Log value added tax factor 0.124 0.040 0.070 10.241∗∗
Change in log value added tax factor 0.002 0.013 1.338 13.626∗∗
of post-tax income with respect to pre-tax income,
RIP ≡
∂ ln(W − T(W))
∂ lnW
=
1 − T 
1 − T/W
, (A7)
where T is the total amount of taxes paid.
Thus, the measure equals the ratio between the marginal income tax
rate and the average income tax rate. This is a rough measure of the cost
(in terms of gross income increases, which aﬀect employment) to a bar-
gaining trade union of achieving net income increases for its members.82
The development and properties of tax progressivity are examined in Fig-
ures A26 and A27 and Tables A8 and A7.
Progressivity remained fairly unchanged from the beginning of our
sample period until the early 1970s, when it increased rapidly for a num-
ber of years. This increase was halted in 1978, when a steady decrease in
progressivity culminated in the 1991 tax reform, when most progressivity
was removed. Since then, little has happened. The series is serially cor-
related, but almost all serial correlation is removed by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing,
as revealed by the correlograms in Figures A26 and A27. Normality is
not rejected for the logged series, whereas the logarithmic change is sig-
niﬁcantly non-normal (cf. Table A7). The ADF tests in Table A8 do not
reject a unit root in the (logged) levels series.
82The measure is discussed and used in Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Holmlund
and Kolm (1995).
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Figure A26: Log residual income progressivity 1961–1997
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Figure A27: Change in log residual income progressivity 1961–1997
106 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesA6.2 Payroll taxes
The payroll taxes in our data set derive from the National Accounts stat-
istics and are generated as the ratio between wage costs including and
excluding employers’ contributions to social security. Payroll taxes are
regulated both by law and contract and diﬀer between diﬀerent categories
of employees (basically, the signiﬁcant diﬀerence is between white-collar
workers and blue-collar workers). As we have no access to the compos-
ition of the workforce, we cannot use direct measures of payroll taxes.
This is why we use the measure from the National Accounts statistics.
The log and the logarithmic diﬀerence of the payroll tax factor are plotted
in ﬁgures A28 and A29.
The payroll taxes stay fairly low over the 1960s and then increase
rapidly during the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, there is little change
in the series, but there is a weak tendency for payroll taxes to go down
since the beginning of the 1990s. We cannot reject non-stationarity for
the log of payroll tax factor, whereas the logarithmic diﬀerence seems to
be stationary. The log series is very far from normality, but it seems that
the diﬀerenced series is much closer to the normal distribution.
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Figure A28: Log payroll tax factor 1961–1997








Log tax wedge 0 yes -1.442 -3.547
Log tax wedge 0 no -2.460 -2.953
Change in the log of the tax wedge 0 yes -5.286** -3.551
Change in the log of the tax wedge 0 no -4.722** -2.593
Log payroll tax factor 0 yes 0.022 -3.528
Log payroll tax factor 1 no -1.191 -2.938
Change in log payroll tax factor 0 yes -4.425** -3.531
Change in log payroll tax factor 0 no -4.272** -2.94
Log income tax factor 3 yes -3.567* -3.547
Log income tax factor 3 no -3.592* -2.953
Change in log income tax factor 3 yes -3.297 -3.551
Change in log income tax factor 3 no -3.112* -2.953
Log value-added tax factor 0 yes -1.476 -3.528
Log value-added tax factor 0 no -1.548 -2.938
Change in log value-added tax factor 0 yes -5.934** -3.531
Change in log value-added tax factor 0 no -5.913** -2.94
Log income tax progressivity factor 0 yes -2.551 -3.547
Log income tax progressivity factor 0 no -1.616 -2.953
Change in log income tax progressivity factor 0 yes -7.901** -3.551
Change in log income tax progressivity factor 0 no -7.917** -2.953
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Figure A29: Change in log payroll tax factor 1961–1997








Log relative import price 0 yes -1.600 -3.528
Log relative import price 0 no -1.484 -2.938
Change in log relative import price 0 yes -5.276** -3.531
Change in log relative import price 0 no -5.351** -2.94
Log replacement ratio 5 yes -0.498 -3.556
Log replacement ratio 5 no -1.828 -2.956
Change in log replacement ratio 2 yes -6.630** -3.551
Change in log replacement ratio 2 no -6.287** -2.953
A7 The relative price of imports
In Section A2.2 above we saw that the wedge between the product real
wage and the consumption real wage has two parts: one reﬂecting diﬀerent
tax rates and one reﬂecting the price of consumption relative to produc-
tion. The latter, in turn, mirrors value added taxes and the relative price
of imports to production. Our measure of the import price is the implicit
price deﬂator for imports from the National Accounts statistics. The log
and the logarithmic diﬀerence of the relative import price are plotted in
ﬁgures A30 and A31.
In a ﬁrst phase ending in 1972, the relative price of imports falls more
or less continuously. The ﬁrst as well as the second oil price shocks coincide
with sharp increases in import prices. Most likely this is further reinforced
by a number of devaluations between 1976 and 1982 (the last two of which,
in 1981 and 1982, amounted to around 25% taken together). The relative
price then falls from around the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, once again
a co-movement with oil prices. The ﬂoat of the Krona in 1992 meant
a sharp depreciation, which coincides with a rather rapid rise in import
prices. The period thereafter has been rather calm.
The log of the import price seems to be non-stationary, whereas non-
stationarity is rejected for the diﬀerenced series. Normality cannot be
rejected for the logged series, whereas the logarithmic diﬀerence is signi-
ﬁcantly non-normal (Table A10).
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Figure A30: Log relative price of imports 1961–1997
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Figure A31: Change in log relative price of imports 1961–1997
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 111Table A10: Normality tests for relative import price and the replacement
ratio
Variable Mean Std. Devn. Skewness Normality χ2
Log relative import price 0.075 0.1190.611 4.267
Change in log relative import price -0.004 0.056 1.065 14.861∗∗
Log replacement ratio -0.246 0.129-1.180 11 .397∗∗
Change in log replacement ratio 0.003 0.126 1.784 15.187∗∗
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system
Our measure of the replacement rate in the unemployment insurance (UI)
system is the ratio between the maximum daily before-tax compensation,
turned into an annual ﬁgure by multiplying it by the relevant number
of days, and the average annual before-tax labour income in the private
sector. We use annual ﬁgures to take account of changes in the number of
working days (and, thus, in the number of compensated days in a year).
Before 1974, UI beneﬁts were not taxed. We have computed a pre tax
compensation by applying the average income tax rate to the before-tax
ﬁgures.
We use the maximum daily compensation rather than, for instance,
the regulated replacement rate. We do so because we are interested in
the compensation for an average employee who risks losing the job. Then
our measure is the relevant magnitude for the unions to care about in
the wage negotiations, rather than the replacement rate for the average
unemployed person, since the pool of unemployed includes a large fraction
of non-unionised entrants into the labour market. Our measure is fairly
comprehensive, but fails to take into account changes in the duration of
beneﬁt entitlements. For other purposes than ours, it also fails to take
into account that there have been changes for those who are not members
of any UI fund. The most important change in this respect is that a
supplementary system, Cash Assistance, was created in 1974.
The development of the log of the replacement rate and its change are
plotted in ﬁgures A32 and A33. The series exhibits a rising trend until
the early 1990s. Since then the replacement rate has fallen considerably.
During the earlier years of our sample period there are some rather big
swings in our measure. To some extent they reﬂect our conversion of the
post-tax compensation to a pre-tax measure: the income tax rate jumps
around quite a lot during these years. The fall in the last part of our
sample period reﬂects a combination of virtually unchanged maximum
compensation and rising wages.
Both the logged series and the logarithmic diﬀerence are signiﬁcantly
non-normal according to the tests in Table A10. The tests in Table A9
indicate that the wedge behaves like an I(1) variable.
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Figure A32: Log replacement rate in the unemployment insurance 1961–
1997
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Figure A33: Change in log replacement rate in the unemployment insur-
ance 1961–1997
114 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesB Estimating the model by FIML 1962–1997
In this appendix we reproduce some of the diagnostic (and other) output
resulting from the estimation of the baseline system transformed to I(0)
space. All the tests are described in Doornik and Hendry (1997).
B1 The estimated equations
We begin with the parameter estimates from the four equations for the
endogenous variables in tables B1, B2, B3 and B4 (the system tests in-
dicated that unemployment and the tax wedge can be treated as weakly
exogenous variables, so we do not model these).83
Table B1: Equation 1 for ∆(w − q)
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
CI1t−1 0.156 0.053 2.917
CI2t−1 -0.002 0.0002 -9.019
Constant -0.501 0.053 -9.420
∆θ 0.405 0.086 4.732
σ =0 .016
Table B2: Equation 2 for ∆γ
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
CI3t−1 0.275 0.042 6.567
Constant 0.172 0.026 6.663
∆u -0.353 0.059-5.9 88
σ =0 .080
B2 System diagnostics
An LR test of over-identifying restrictions gives χ2(8) = 7.971[0.436], so
the restrictions we impose are not rejected against the unrestricted reduced
form.
The cross-equation residual correlations are reproduced in Table B5.
83CI1, CI2 and CI3 are the three cointegrating combinations.
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
CI1t−1 -0.110 0.196 -0.561
CI2t−1 0.002 0.001 2.377
Constant 0.543 0.210 2.583
∆θ -0.496 0.300 -1.654
σ =0 .056
Table B4: Equation 4 for ∆ρ
Variable Coeﬃcient Std.Error t-value
CI1t−1 2.299 0.318 7.231
CI3t−1 -0.282 0.052 -5.388
Constant 0.5890.089 6.637
∆u -0.107 0.063 -1.699
∆θ -1.073 0.502 -2.136
σ =0 .087
Table B5: Correlation of residuals
∆(w − q)∆ γ ∆(pI − pp)∆ ρ
∆(w − q) 1.00
∆γ 0.065 1.00
∆(pI − pp) 0.390 -0.210 1.00
∆ρ -0.499 0.056 -0.183 1.00
116 IFAU—ALMPs and wagesTesting for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 5 gives χ2(80) =
89.97[0.209] and in F-form(80,37) = 0.869 [0.704]. Thus, there is no serious
autocorrelation problem at the systems level.
A vector normality test gives χ2(8) = 24.417[0.002]∗∗.T h u s ,a sp o i n t e d
out in the main text, there are strong indications of non-normal residuals.
Testing for vector heteroscedasticity using squares gives χ2(100) =
101.08[0.451] and in F-form(100,97) = 0.783 [0.887]. Testing for vec-
tor heteroscedasticity using squares and cross-products gives χ2(200) =
209.18[0.314] and in F-form(200,40) = 0.684 [0.952]. Thus, there are no
indications of heteroskedasticity problems at the systems level.
B3 Single equation diagnostics
Next, we look at the single equations in the model. We begin by invest-
igating residual autocorrelation. Autocorrelation coeﬃcients and an LM
test are reported in Table B6. The only equation with some slight problem
is the equation for the wage share, which marginally passes the test.
Table B6: Single equation autocorrelation statistics
Equation lag1 lag2 lag3 lag4 lag5 Fp - v a l u e
∆(w − q) 0.286 -0.006 0.477 -0.407 0.134 2.063 0.104
∆γ 0.196 0.018 -0.346 0.005 -0.116 1.222 0.328
∆(pI − pp) -0.028 -0.070 0.136 -0.004 -0.050 0.806 0.556
∆ρ -0.074 -0.158 0.144 -0.058 0.274 0.595 0.704
Next, we look at residual normality in the single equations in Table B7.
All equations except the one for the relative import price pass the test for
residual normality. The latter equation, on the other hand, is not even
close to passing the test. The signiﬁcant test at the systems level thus
mainly reﬂects problems in this equation.
Table B7: Single equation normality tests
Equation χ2 p-value
∆(w − q) 0.3690.832
∆γ 3.531 0.171
∆(pI − pp) 16.837 0.0002
∆ρ 3.6390.162
IFAU—AMLPs and wages 117As there are no indications at all of ARCH problems in any of the
equations, we do not report these statistics.
Finally, as regards heteroskedasticity, both tests using the squares of
the regressors and tests using cross-products of the regressors in addition
to their squares indicate heteroskedasticity in the equation for the replace-
ment rate (p-values 0.002 and 0.006), whereas the equation for the relative
import price only passes the tests marginally (p-values 0.108 and 0.192).
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